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ABSTRACT
DEBATING THE IDEAL SOVIET WOMAN: PUBLIC DISCUSS IONS OF
GENDER AND MORALITY IN KHRUSHCHEV' S RUSSIA
by Chelsea Jo Miller
August 2013
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's 1961 Third Party Program and its
"Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" dictated that Soviet society would be
transformed into a Communist utopia over the course of twenty years. As part of Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev's larger reform program, the "Moral Code" detailed the ideal
characteristics of future Communists while also outlining their relationships with each
other, the collective, and the state. Recently, scholars such as Deborah Field and Susan
E. Reid have begun to address the tensions between public and private life that
characterized this period. Both find that the state actively sought to intervene in the lives
of Soviet citizens. Additionally, Miriam Dobson and Brian LaPierre have stressed the
presence of illiberal currents in the Khrushchev era, finding that this period featured
greater repression and state control, as opposed to the traditional interpretation of the era
as a time of liberal reform and greater freedom of expression. Utilizing the drafts of the
Party program, suggestions submitted to the Party, contemporary articles and editorials,
and the relevant secondary literature, this thesis argues that the ambiguity surrounding the
"Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" created an opportunity for public
participation and debate, which Soviet men and women used to forward their own gender
ideals, even those which ran counter to the liberal ideas of the Thaw era and called for
greater intervention in the fam ily and the workplace.
ii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On 14 August 1961, the editors of Pravda, the official newspaper of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, published an article written by Vera Panova, a
well-known writer. 1 In her article, she recounted the typical day of a Soviet woman.
After working long hours at a factory, the woman of Panova's piece did not immediately
return home to rest. Instead, she waited in numerous lines at various stores, continuing
the never-ending search for food, clothing, and other household products in a country
chronically plagued by shortages in consumer goods. Panova continued that when this
ideal woman finally returned home, she tended to the children, prepared dinner, and
cleaned the apartment, all while her husband rested. Holidays, in Panova's opinion,
served only as a rare break for this Soviet worker and mother - granting her a short
opportunity to meet with her friends or attend the local theater. She was calling on the
Party to lighten women's burdens at home so that they could be more active participants
in Soviet society.
At the same time that Panova was promoting her opinions in the pages of Pravda,
unnamed individuals from a different area of Soviet Russia, the Kirov region, were
forwarding their own ideas on the ideal Soviet woman. In a suggestion submitted to the
Party, these individuals promoted the more maternal aspects of Soviet women. They
advocated mutual respect in the family, concern for children' s moral upbringing, and care
and attention for the "woman-mother," an individual simultaneously fulfilling her public
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Vera Panova, "Zhivet so mnoi riadom zhenshchina," Pravda, August I 4, 1961.

2
duty and also caring for her family. 2 Instead of freeing women from the home, these
individual s wanted the Party to stress a woman's connection with the family. Both
Panova and the individuals from Kirov were taking part in a large public discussion on
the Party's newly unveiled Third Party Program and "Moral Code of the Builder of
Communism." The morality code's ideals for the future Communist society served as a
base for individuals to voice their own opinions on the ideal woman of Khrushchev-era
society.
Both of these opinions, from individuals at the top and bottom of Soviet society,
argued for a particular gender ideal for Soviet women - a Soviet woman, who
simultaneously fulfilled the roles of worker, wife, cultured subject, and mother - while
differing on which component of this ideal should be raised above the others. Their
ideas, however, excluded many Soviet women. Despite Panova's lengthy description of
the average woman's day, she did not account for women who were single, divorced, or
simply did not see the value in devoting their off-work hours to raising their children or
tidying the apartment. Through attempting to describe the average Soviet woman's life,
Panova pushed for greater Party attention to the task oflessening women's burden in the
home. Both suggestions, however, were promoting their own ideas of what it meant to be
a Soviet woman in the Khrushchev era.
Neither of these suggestions was seen as remarkable or absurd. By publishing
Panova' s article, the editors of Pravda endorsed it. They were allied with the Party,
especially as the chief editor, Pavel Satiukov, was also serving as a member of the
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Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei lstorii (RGANI), fond (f.) l, opis (op.) 4,
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Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the time.
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Panova's

article was part of a much larger .public debate surrounding the Communist Party's new
Third Party Program. The Party unveiled its new Party program in 1961 , promising the
construction of a new Communist society over the course of twenty years. In addition to
dictating the ambitious economical quotas needed to build Communism, the program 's
"Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" detailed the moral values of the ideal
Communist. This thesis argues that while the Third Party Program was primarily focused
on constructing this ideal future society, it also allowed men and women an opportunity
to debate ideal gender roles. The ambiguous messages from the state provided no clear
direction as to women's proper role in society. The Party was simultaneously promoting
a renewed campaign for women's equal treatment in the workplace and stressing her role
as mother and caregiver. During the period of public commentary, Party leaders openly
solicited public participation in order to educate subjects on the provisions of the Party
program and ensure that the tenets of the "Moral Code" were aligned with society. It also
allowed individuals from all levels of Soviet society to promote their own opinions on
women's roles in the family, the workplace, and the upbringing of their children, leading
to a diverse and often contradictory discussion of moral values and social norms.
The Third Party Program and its "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" are
commonly viewed as part of a larger period ofliberalization and reform in the Soviet
Union, known as the Thaw. In 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced
Joseph Stalin in his famous "Secret Speech." The era of de-Stalinization brought a
relaxation of state terror, a greater concern for standards of living, and the emergence of a

' " In Memory of a Comrade," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, no. 46 ( 1973 ): 3 I.
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limited pluralism. Stalin 's death and, later, the "Secret Speech" also signaled an easing
of artistic restrictions, allowing_artists to deviate from Socialist Realism, the official
artistic style, and experiment with abstraction. Finally, the 1950s also featured a
downsizing of the Gulag system. The Party granted amnesties to nonpolitical pri soners
and later began to reexamine the cases of those arrested for political crimes. 5 All of these
policies sought to relax Stalin-era repression and allow a small measure of personal
expression.
The Thaw era, however, was also characterized by the stop-and-go nature of
Khrushchev's reforms. While Khrushchev initially tolerated artist experimentation, in
December 1962 he erupted during an exhibition of nonconformist art at the Manezh
gallery. He attacked the abstract nature of the paintings, saying, "What is hung here is
simply anti-Soviet. It's amoral. Art should ennoble the individual and arouse him to
action." 6 Similarly, by the early 1960s the state had also reversed its policies on
combating crime and hooliganism. Incarceration rates were once again growing and the
po licy of downsizing the Gulag system was being reversed.7
Amid these reforms, Khrushchev announced, as part of the Third Party Program,
that Communism would be built in the Soviet Union. 8 More importantly fo r the purposes
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Je re my Smith, " Introduction," in Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in
the Soviet Union, 1953-1 964, ed. Me lanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith (New York, NY: Rout ledge,
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6
Prisci lla Johnson and Leopold La bedz, ed., Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of
Soviet Culture, 1962-1964 (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts In st itute ofTechnology, 1965), 103.
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of this thesis, its morality code specified the moral values of an ideal Soviet subject. The
code's tenets prai sed loyalty to the Communi st Party, allegiance to the collective,
intolerance of parasitism and hooliganism, and defense of the Soviet motherland . Due to
the emphasis the "Moral Code" placed on the future Communist society, Catriona Kelly
positions it within the broader sphere of post-Stalin advice literature. De-Stalinization
caused people to question the implications of both the eased relations with capitalist
nations and the increasing availability of some consumer goods for a Communist society.
As a result, Kelly argues that in addition to hygiene and self-education, hallmarks of
advice literature of the Stalin era, the Moral Code strove to harmonize Communist
ideology and material comfort. This literature not only encouraged people to practice
self-restraint and modesty, but it also served as a means of discussing what it meant to be
a morally-upright Soviet man or woman in the family and the workplace.

9

During the two months of open discussion on the Third Party Program, the Party
received roughly 170,800 letters with suggestions and comments on the program' s draft.
In addition to these letters, approximately 3.5 million people took part in discussions of
the draft and submitted their collective opinions to the Party. to Their suggestions
included placing a stronger emphasis on m ilitary defense, strengthening the collective,
and advocating for more attention to children 's upbringing, whether this meant promoting
a nuclear fami ly, multi-generational family, or the replacement of these by state
institutions. After reviewing various suggestions, the Party leaders submitted a final
version of the Third Pa11y Program to the XXII Party Congress for ratification in October
1961.
9
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Citing Party leaders' efforts to prescribe specific moral values for their subjects,
scholars of Soviet morality have interpreted the "Moral Code" as an example of Soviet
paternalism. The code's tenets encouraged good relations at work, solidarity with other
nations, and care for the public good. Its authors designed the "Moral Code" to reshape
Soviet society into a better ideologically-based and collectively-oriented unit. According
to Richard T. de George, the Party leadership felt that they needed to form the new Soviet
man. The primary objective would be to instill in Soviet subjects obedience to the Party,
evidenced by calling for "devotion to the cause of Communism" in the first tenet of the
"Moral Code." 11 Their paternalistic goals continued through prescribing their own ideals
of proper family, work, and social relations onto Soviet society, dictating, for example,
exactly how a Soviet woman should feel and act in relation to her family, workplace, and
Soviet society in general.
Despite these paternalistic aspects, the Party did not use the secret police to force
the ideals of the Moral Code onto society. Instead, collectives oversaw the
transformation of their own members into morally correct Communists. This collective
element required state leaders and members of society to work collaboratively, shaping
and enforcing proper Communist morality both from above and below. Everyone would
be mobilized for the construction of the new Communist society. Limited archival access
forced early scholars of the Thaw and the Third Party Program to focus on published
versions of the program. By studying the public commentary on the "Moral Code," this
thesis complicates previous scholars' interpretations of Soviet moral paternalism,
stressing the participatory nature of the Thaw.

11

Richard T. de George, Soviet Ethics and Morality (Ann Arbor, MI: The Un iversity of
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Party leaders did not force these moral tenets on society but invited public
.participation. They wanted to reform society, openly soliciting a public debate on the
future values of Communist society. Furthermore, the ambiguous wording of the code' s
tenets required individuals in society to discuss the true meaning of the tenets and their
implications for day-to-day life. The resulting suggestions for revising the "Moral
Code," whether submitted by members of the program commission or Soviet subjects
during the period of public debate, argued for a variety of moral ideals. Individuals
simultaneously pushed for greater equality in the workplace, mpre aid for mothers,
increased attention to boarding schools, and praise for parents' role in the moral
upbringing of their children. Each suggestion hoped to improve the moral character of
the future builders of Communism but through drastically different approaches. Moral
reform would be achieved through public participation, not through paternalism.
The authors of the "Moral Code" focused on both public and private morality,
because in the Soviet Union these two spheres were entangled. The moral mission to
reshape society led Party leaders to view the family a~ part of public life. Authorities
printed advice literature on proper parenting techniques, using pedagogical research to
create better fam ilies. Parents' collectives then used this literature not only to help each
other with fami ly issues, but also to educate individuals remaining outside the collective.
Oleg Kharkhordin finds that the post-Stalin era featured a growing emphasis on social
control groups, such as collectives, enforcing moral standards in individuals' personal
lives and at work through guidance and education, not punishment. 12 The suggestions
submitted to the Party regarding the "Moral Code" highlight the blurred line between

12

O leg Kh arkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices
(Berkeley, CA: University of Cali fornia Press, 1999), 122.
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private and public. Individuals felt comfortable submitting their opinions on the proper
· role of the family in society and debating the nature of the family. Furthermore,
suggestions debated the roles of men and women in the family and in the workplace.
Due to their implications for state goals and the betterment of society, these private areas
became part of public Soviet discourse. The suggestions submitted regarding subjects '
moral education and the role of women in society highlight this entangled nature of
public and private life. By calling for Soviet men and women to publicly discuss such
topics, the Party encouraged people to propose their own ideas for how others should live
their lives, even when these suggestions called for more intervention into people' s lives.
Historiography
As evidenced by the mass public participation surrounding the Party program and
the code, the debate on Soviet moral ideals extended beyond Khrushchev and the
program commission. Soviet men and women, industrial and agricultural workers,
teachers, activists, and academic scholars all strove to influence these policies and
advance their own agendas, whether advocating gender equality, increased privacy, or
children' s education. Utilizing the drafts of the Party program and the large public input
that it generated, this thesis builds upon previous research to add a gender lens to the
public commentary surrounding the "Moral Code." It will demonstrate that the confusing
and participatory nature of the Thaw led to active debate of the proper roles for men and
women in society.
Stephen Bittner's study of Moscow's Arbat region examines the implications of
the Thaw's ambi guous nature for Soviet society. He argues that Party authorities' mixed
messages regarding new policies allowed individuals to participate in policy making by

9
implementing their own interpretations of these directives. The de-Stalinization process
happened so quickly that individuals had a difficult time understanding exactly how
leaders wanted them to think and act. In the early 1960s, for example, a new highway
was constructed in Moscow, connecting the city center with the residential
neighborhoods west of the center. Due to de-Stalinization, however, some architects
used the design of this highway as a way to resurrect constructivism, an avant-garde
architectural school of the 1920s that strove to combine new materials and geometric
designs with a minimalist approach to the role of art in everyday life. However, while
these architects interpreted state messages as a call for new construction, other
individuals intensified efforts to preserve the pre-revolutionary buildings of the area. As
Bittner shows, the ambiguous nature of these messages allowed people in the Arbat
region to propose their own interpretations of certain policies, creating a window of
participation in an otherwise authoritarian regime. 13
In addition to debating the meaning behind ambiguous Party and state decrees,
Soviet society was also examining what it meant to be a Soviet man or woman. The
easing of Cold War relations resulted in Soviet subjects increasingly coming into contact
with music, film, art, and even people from Europe and the United States. Additionally,
the return of Gulag prisoners confronted Soviet society with individuals it had previously
cast off as anti-Soviet. These tensions are part of the illiberal undercurrents circulating in
the Khrushchev era. While the standard interpretation of this period focuses on the
progressive reforms and easing of restrictions, recently some historians have emphasized
efforts by the state and society during this period to intervene in individuals' lives to

13

Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives ofKhrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in
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make them more ideologicall y appropriate. In an analysis of public reactions to
Alexander Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life ofIvan Denisovich, Miriam Dobson finds
that Solzhenitsyn's novella functioned as a point of debate for the changes taking place in
the post-Stalin era. She argues that there were not specific factions in society in favo r or
against reform, but rather people often welcomed some changes while opposing others.
For example, Dobson shows that while people were in favor of rehabilitating political
victims of the terror, they also felt that petty criminals in the camps would threaten
cultured Soviet society. 14 Dobson's work challenges the traditionally liberal
interpretation of the Gulag amnesty by highlighting the views of those opposed to the
amnesty and concerned about its potentially destructive effects on society.
Brian LaPierre also challenges the liberal interpretation of the Thaw. Dobson' s
analysis focuses primarily on society' s reactions to Thaw-era reforms and, as a result,
does not discuss whether or not the illiberal elements of the Thaw era extended into
policymaking. LaPierre argues that the decree on petty hooliganism was not only about
decriminalizing petty hooligans and lessening harsh sentences, as scholars of the liberal
Thaw would argue. The decree also strove for "universal punishment."

15

Everyday

activities, such as drunkenness or vulgar language, became anti-social behavior. Petty
hooli ganism served as a method of policing public and private space and extended the
state's reach into the daily lives of its subjects. LaPierre's analysis of the petty hooligan
campaign shows that the Thaw, a period known for liberalization, was also the scene of
increasing persecution and intolerance.

14
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State efforts to crackdown on hooligani sm were part of a larger effort to instill
Communist morality i.n Soviet subj ects. Hooligans' drunkenness, theft, and parasitism
were seen as a threat to Soviet society. In her study of Communist morality, Deborah
Field argues that through creating new lifecycle rituals, leaders in the Khrushchev era
hoped to inculcate a new Communist morality in society and strengthen the ties between
public and private life. While the Thaw is typically known for a decrease in state terror
and coercion, Field's research shows that the regulation of personal lives actually
increased. Communist morality was designed to further intertwine the private and public
spheres in order to work for the greatest common good. Collectives, the Komsomol or
Youth Communist League, and the Party were all prepared to correct individuals and
steer them on the morally proper path. Field is clear, though, that "Communist morality
resembles a screen window: slightly pliable with holes that allow some permeability. At
the same time, it was not infinitely flexible, especially for the people charged with
enforcing it." 16 Discussions of morality functioned within the realm of Communist
ideology. Limited resources and ineffective implementation hindered authorities' efforts
to reshape society. More so, though, Soviet citizens refused to concede their individual
interests. Field' s work demonstrates the rich battle between Khrushchev 's attempts to
intervene in people's lives to strengthen social control and individuals' desires to
structure their lives and families in a manner of their choosing.

Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev 's Russia devotes great
attention to the conflict of private versus public. Field includes chapters on love, sexual
morality, and parenting to highlight relationships between men and women. However,

16
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she focuses her analysis on the moral discourse in these realms. Specifically in regards to
gender, Field mentions contradictory attitudes toward men and women on topics such as
sexuality and proper parental roles. Beyond this, she does not delve deeply into attitudes
surrounding gender roles. This thesis hopes to add a gendered element to her analysis of
how individuals reacted to Communist morality. It will show how people used this
pliable ideological and moral "screen window" to discuss their views on gender
relationships.
The debates on Communist morality and Soviet gender ideals did not distinguish
between public and private spheres. As discussed earlier, the Party viewed families as
part of a larger collective Soviet society. Families served as another institution that the
Party could mobilize for its own goals. Susan E. Reid argues that not everyone agreed
with this view of the family. She finds that many families saw the kitchens of the new
single-family apartments as a site of private life, free from state intrusion. For the state,
however, the kitchen served as an object of scientific modernization, one of the main
paths to the construction of Communism. Following Sputnik's launch in October 1957, it
seemed apparent that socialist science was superior to all others. As a result, the Third
Party Program repeatedly aligned the building of Communism with scientific and
technological progress. Reid shows that the Party felt a strong need to penetrate the
unregulated private realm, especially that of the Soviet housewife. Party leaders feared
that private apartments would weaken the collective and wanted to combat the one-family
mentality. The Party hoped to achieve this through advice and education campaigns on
proper housework techniques, advances in household appliances, and the scientific design
of the kitchen, which would squeeze maximum efficiency into the smallest possible

- · 13

space. Reid argues that the state's intrusion into the kitchen was not designed to alter
gender role~ or in any way free women. Instead, it placed additional requirements on
women and alienated them from all that they knew about the home.

17

Reid's work provides great insights into how the state sought to intervene in the
domestic sphere. She focuses on the debates between the state and women, scientific
advances and established cleaning and cooking practices. This thesis will also look at the
interactions between state policy and opinions on gender, although doing so in a more
public arena. The stress on the scientific and technological revolution, as seen
throughout Reid's argument, illustrates the state's prioritization of progress and steadfast
focus on building Communism. This thesis will also study how the state's fixation on
progress and technology affected its interactions with society. By focusing on gender
instead of just women, however, this thesis will bring men's opinions into the analysis,
showing the tum of some individuals toward what they felt were more established gender
roles in the face of dynamic social changes.
Arranged thematically, this thesis will address the views of the writers of the
Code and those of society. Chapter II provides a history of the Third Party Program and
the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism." Party programs were designed to show
the way to a new stage in the Soviet Union's development. Following the "Secret
Speech" and the successful launch of Sputnik, the leaders of the Communist Party drafted
a new Party program, designed to build a new Communist society. Chapters III and IV
will address the public commentary surrounding the Moral Code. In Chapter III, this
thesis will show that some individuals used the opportunity for participation in the pubic

17
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debate and the messages of relaxed control to promote a more nuclear family, with
children raised by members of the family and not relying on nurseries, kindergartens, or
boarding schools. Support was not unanimous, however, as other individuals argued for
a more collective upbringing of children, calling on various state organizations to
intervene in family life to regulate people's moral education. Chapter IV will then ·
discuss how these debates carried over into the workplace. Some individuals argued for
equal treatment of men and women as colleagues, but others countered that the Party
should promise a reduction in hours for women. This would allow women to devote
more attention to cooking, housework, and childcare. Both chapters will show that the
unsettled and confusing nature of the Khrushchev era invited public participation and
allowed people to promote contradictory gender roles simultaneously in the discussion of
the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism."
Sources
As noted above, this thesis uses various forms of public commentary to analyze
conflicting notions of gender during this period. In addition to Party publications and
accounts printed in newspapers, magazines, and the so-called thick journals, archival
documents are crucial to establishing the ideas circulating in society. 18 The Russian State
Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) houses the reports of the commission
members charged with reviewing the program. Their notes and changes show the ideals
they prioritized and illustrate how they gradually shaped the Party program into its final
18

Thick journals are so named due to their large size. Unlike other periodicals publi shed
in the Soviet Union, the monthly-published thick journals commonly numbered over one hundred
pages per issue. Popular thick journals during the Khrushchev period included Novyi mir and
· Zvezda. Many thick journals dealt with literary topics, but others, such as Kommunist, were used
as another political organ of the Communist Party. These journals operated alongside smaller
periodicals, such as Rabotnitsa and Sem 'ia i shkola, whose monthly issues typically numbered
less than forty pages.
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form. Their arguments are supported by the large education campaigns organized by the
Komsomol. These are found through meeting minutes and reports of Komsomol Party
leaders stored in the Komsomol division of RGASPI. Additionally, the Russian State
Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) contains the records of Central Committee
meetings held during the weeks leading up to the program draft's publication as well as
letters and reports submitted to the Party during the period of public discussion. These
sources provide a detailed account of the suggestions men, women, and Party members
deemed important enough to pass on to the authorities. Research for this thesis is limited
to the archives in Moscow. As a result, this analysis does not attempt to cover
discussions of gender roles taking place throughout the remainder of the Soviet Union at
this time, nor does it claim to apply these conclusions outside of Soviet Russia.

1-6

CHAPTER II
THE.KHRUSHCHEV ERA AND THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM
This chapter will examine how the diverse public discussion surrounding the
"Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" was a product of the various dynamics at
play in the Thaw period. The Thaw era is commonly characterized as a period of liberal
reform. Its policies, however, were often ambiguous in nature, inviting public debate on
the intended meanings of the reforms. Reforms, furthermore, proceeded in a zigzagging
manner, leaving individuals in Soviet society uneasy and anxious about how the state
would react. Among these reforms was the mass amnesty of non-political Gulag
prisoners and Khrushchev's "Secret Speech," which denounced Stalin's cult of
personality and use of state terror. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union embarked on a new
ambitious agricultural program, surpassed the United States in the space race, and began
a large urban housing construction project. The utopian hopes fo llowing these
accomplishments coexisted with concerns surrounding the renewed openness with the
West, fearing the potential decay of society as a result of foreign influences. Responding
to these anxieties, Party leaders drafted a new Party program in the late 1950s, designed
to usher in a new Communist era. With suggestions from Party leaders, scientists, and
teachers, as well as common industrial and collective farm workers, the Party released the
Third Party Program and its morality code. The new program would guide Soviet society
in the creation of a new Soviet man - the builder of Communism.
The Thaw
The Third Pa11y Program was part of the larger Thaw era, which featured various
poli cy reforms and increased freedom of expression. It began after Joseph Stalin, who

17 ·

had been the supreme leader of the Soviet Union for over two decades, suffered a major
stroke and died on 3 March 1953. Following hi s death, three men, Lavrenti Beria, Georgii
.

l

Malenkov, and Nikita Khrushchev, emerged initially in a form of collective leadership.
None of these men held complete control over the country - Beria was in charge of the
state security and internal affairs, Malenkov led the state apparatus, and Khrushchev
served as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Elena Zubkova argues that these

.

men knew
they could not replicate Stalin's style of rule. They still firmly believed in the
.
Party dictatorship and authoritarian rule, but none of them possessed the quasi-divine
charisma that had existed around Stalin. If Beria, Malenkov, or Khrushchev hoped to
emerge as the new sole leader of the Soviet Union, they needed to distinguish themselves
from the others and also distance themselves from their Stalinist pasts.

19

Less than one month after Stalin's death, large policy changes were already
emerging. On 27 March 1953, Beria announced an amnesty for Gulag prisoners that
would go into effect immediately. All prisoners with sentences of five years or less,
pregnant women or women with young children, and individuals under the age of
eighteen would be freed from the camp system. The following week Beria announced
that he was also calling off investigations into the Doctor's Plot, a conspiracy alleging
that doctors within the Kremlin were plotting to kill high-level officials. 20 In 1954, the
Central Committee, under Khrushchev, announced it would also begin reopening cases of
political prisoners, individuals who had been arrested for supposedly betraying the Soviet
Union or plotting with capitalist nations. Khrushchev and Beria knew that the economic
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inefficie.ncies in the Gulag system could not be overcome. 21 These announcements
signaled a change in the leadership. Stalin had stressed that the presence of anti-Soviet
elements within society posed a real threat to the Soviet Union, defining such elements as
spies, saboteurs, or anyone else plotting against the state. Beria and, after Beria's arrest,
Khrushchev continued to stress the need to defend Soviet society against these anti-Soviet
elements. By defining "anti-Soviet" as hooligans, parasites, religious believers, and
others operating outside of Communist morality, however, Khrushchev changed the
boundaries between cultured and uncultured and allowed Gulag prisoners, previously
believed to threaten the future of the Soviet Union, to return to normal society.
While the Gulag amnesty had political implications for Beria and Khrushchev, its
ramifications for Soviet society were much greater. Officials tried to keep the inner
workings of the Gulag system secret, but the "Secret Speech" and the condemnation of
the Doctor's Plot created a new openness in society. 22 As Dobson has argued, however,
not everyone was excited to be confronted with the Gulag system. Some Soviet subj ects
were unhappy to see returning Gulag prisoners, feeling these anti-Soviet elements posed a
threat to ordered and cultured society. 23 Their concerns were compounded by the
growing anxiety surrounding the increasing openness of the Soviet Union and the
detrimental influence of foreigners and foreign culture on Soviet youth. Dobson also
notes, however, that for Khrushchev the Gulag amnesties and attack on Stalin' s use of
terror were a sign that the Party was again moving in the right direction. By clarifying
that Stalin was responsible for the past injustices, Khrushchev believed that he was
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reviving the Party and returning it to its true Leninist core. The Soviet Union was once
again on the road to Communism, a goal that would soon be achieved.

24

While Khrushchev had been able to justify the downsizing of the Gulag system
due to its chronic economic inefficiency, with agricultural refom1s he was opposed to any
policy that would move away from collectivization. Stalin had collectivized the
countryside by the early 1930s. He ordered the confiscation of peasants' property and
forced them to work on state-owned farms. Collectivization also led to the arrest and
deportation or execution of supposed kulaks, spawning protests in which peasants killed
their livestock or destroyed their crops. It dealt Soviet agriculture a blow from which it
would never recover. While Khrushchev refused to abandon collectivization, he was not
opposed to the idea of ambitious projects. The Soviet Union needed some form of
agricultural reform in order to increase crop production and bring an end to the cycle of
devastating famines. Khrushchev announced the Virgin Lands Campaign, which would
transform the steppe lands of Central Asia, traditionally used for herding livestock, into
farmland. 25 He believed that cultivating more land in different regions of the Soviet
Union would allow for greater agricultural production and also greater security in the
case of regional droughts. By diversifying the country's agricultural regions, Khrushchev
could promise that the Soviet Union would no longer fall victim to famine. In the case of
drought or natural disaster in the black soil regions of the Ukraine or southern Soviet
Russia, the crops of the Virgin Lands would continue to feed the Soviet population. In a
massive publicity campaign, Khrushchev called on Komsomol members and young
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adults throughout the country to move to Central Asia and develop the Virgin Lands,
allowing the Soviet Union to surpass the United States agriculturally and assuring Soviet
subj ects of the Party' s ability to feed them.

26

Despite Khrushchev 's grand promise, it was clear by the early 1960s that the
Virgin Lands Campaign had brought only limited success. The new collective farms
could not deliver the long-term high yields the Party had envisioned. By disrupting the
natural steppe environment, the campaign turned parts of the Kazakh republic into a dust
bowl. The campaign also had negative effects on the Soviet Union's other agricultural
areas. By diverting vital resources to the Virgin Lands, other agricultural regions fell
even further behind on their quotas. 27 In 1960, the Soviet Union's meat production had
actually declined. 28 Factories produced fewer corn combines in 1960 than they had in
29

1957.

Initially, however, the Virgin Lands Campaign had been a great source of

excitement. Like the Gulag amnesties, it had demonstrated that change was not only
possible, but was actually taking place within the Soviet Union. Soviet society was once
again on the path to Communism.
Khrushchev ' s reform policies extended beyond the realm of agriculture or social
policing. They also featured a small measure of freedom of expression in society,
especially in the arts. The Gulag amnesties and the decision to reinvestigate the cases of
political prisoners sent a signal to writers and artists that they were safe from Stalinist
terror and could begin to experiment with their work. Writers such as Ilya Ehrenburg and
26
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Vladimir Pomerantsev called for greater honesty about life under Stalin and frankness
about the negative aspects of life in the Soviet Union. 30 It was unclear, however, exactly
how far writers and artists could push the conventional boundaries of Soviet culture.
Vladimir Dudintsev's 1956 novel , Not By Bread Alone, criticized Stalin-era bureaucrats
and their hindering of progress. Criticizing corrupt or inept Soviet bureaucrats had been
a common trend dating back to Lenin in the early 1920s and, as a result, Party officials
agreed to publish the book in the Soviet Union. Readers, however, interpreted the book
as a critique of the repressive nature of the Stalin era as a whole. In light of the other
changes taking place in post-Stalin Soviet society, these readers viewed the book's
publication as a signal of the Party's willingness to call its own past into question.
Boris Pasternak's novel, Doctor Zhivago, was written shortly after Not By Bread

Alone. It presented a critical view of the Soviet Union, portraying the Revolution as
misdirected and corrupted as well as criticizing the dogmatic nature of Soviet ideology.
As a result, leaders deemed it inappropriate and refused to publish it. After the
manuscript was snuck out of the country and published in Milan and Pasternak was
awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, Party leaders further denounced the work and
ordered him to refuse the award. 31 Their response signaled another unexpected shift in
Thaw-era policy. Due to the zigzagging nature of Khrushchev's policies, individuals in
Soviet society were unable to predict how policies would be interpreted. They were
anxious about how the Party would act next. Even with these attacks, though, Party
leaders neither ordered the murder of Pasternak, nor sent him to a labor camp. Despite
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instances of the tightening of state control on the arts, the Thaw era featured an overall
greater tolerance of non-conformist artistic styles.
The defining moment of the Thaw was Khrushchev's famous denunciation of
Stalin in the "Secret Speech."

32

While artists had already begun to speak more freely

about everyday life and reform measures had begun to rollback Stalin's Gulag policies;
the "Secret Speech" publicly criticized the leader and signaled a new direction for the
Party. On 14 February 1956, at the XX Party Congress, Khrushchev assembled the
delegates for a special session. He spoke for four hours on the crimes of Stalin, attacking
the leader for the blood purges of the Party and the Red Army in the 1930s. Khrushchev
also criticized Stalin's cult of personality, chastising the leader who "ignored the norms
of Party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership." 33
Finally, the "Secret Speech" announced the need for a return to socialist legality, or
making decisions based on laws and not the whim of the leader. While Khrushchev
delivered the speech to a closed session of the congress, he required all Party
organizations to read the speech to their own members. He wanted the news of his
denunciation of Stalin to spread throughout the Party both inside the Soviet Union and in
the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. Despite strictly ordering that the contents of the
speech stay within the Party apparatus, Party members shared the news with others,
causing shock and disbelief as individuals were confronted with the crimes of Stalin.

It was unclear, however, exactl y how far the attack on Stalin and his policies was
supposed to extend. Khrushchev had been careful to criticize only certain aspects of
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Stalin 's rule. The "Secret Speech" was ambiguous about the many other indi viduals who
fell victim to the Terror or the great unrest and death caused by collectivization. Within
the Soviet Union, furthermore, some individuals continued to revere Stalin for his efforts
to transform the country into an industrial society and a global superpower. They
believed that Khrushchev's denunciation had hurt the strength of the Communist cause,
vilifying one of the movement's most influential men. 34 The denunciation also led to
more fundamental concerns. People were unclear about what they should do with busts
or portraits of Stalin. Also, they questioned why Khrushchev was making these remarks
in 1956, when he had worked under Stalin for decades and had led the Party for three
years following the leader's death. Finally, some people anxiously wondered if the
"Secret Speech" meant that they should no longer follow or obey other Stalin-era leaders.
If Stalin had been proven guilty of these crimes, then the men he had put in power in the

Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe were unfit to rule. While Khrushchev
had been clear to criticize only certain aspects of Stalin's rule, his denunciation left
society uneasy about what other aspects of Soviet culture needed to be called into
question.
The Thaw era is best characterized by its ambiguity. Individuals were unsure how
to react to returning Gulag prisoners - while the state had granted amnesty to the
prisoners, these anti-Soviet elements were also perceived as a serious threat to cultured
.and civilized society. Khrushchev's agricultural reforms promised higher yields and
plentiful food , yet consumer markets still suffered from chronic shortages. Finally, the
"Secret Speech" was ambiguous and contradictory in what it chose to denounce and omit.
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It attacked the cult of personality and pledged to return to Leninist norms, while
Khrushchev systematically destroyed the collective leadership and took his place as the
sole leader of the Soviet Union. A ll of these contradictions led to a rise in public debate,
openly solicited by the Party. Leaders called upon individuals in society to promote their
own interpretations of these policies, hoping to guide Soviet society along the path to
Communism.
The Promise of a New Era
Amid the ambiguity of the Thaw and de-Stalinization, Soviet subjects were also
witnessing groundbreaking scientific progress. These rapid developments led some
individuals to dream of the advent of a new era in Soviet or even global history. On 4
October 1957, Soviet scientists launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite, into
space.

35

Space travel was no longer simply a dream of science fiction, but suddenly

became a real possibility in the minds of Soviet subjects. On 12 April 1961, the Soviet
Union took another leap forward when Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the
Earth. After successfully completing his flight, Gagarin was flown to Moscow, where he
was paraded in front of huge crowds of adoring fans. 36 German Titov repeated Gagarin's
success on 8 August 1961. 37 The achievements of these men and the Soviet space
program signified a great achievement for Soviet society. The once backwards state had
conquered the cosmos. At the parade welcoming Gagarin back from space, Khrushchev
spoke of the importance of Gagarin's fli ght. He remarked that the Soviet Union, which
had been viewed as illiterate and barbaric had now become a superpower and pioneer in
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space. "Let everyone who 's sharpening their claws against us know, let them know that
Yurka was in space, that he saw and knows everything." 38
Gagarin and Titov became symbols of what young people in the Soviet Union
could accomplish. Both men were part of the postwar generation the Party was calling
upon to build Communism. Due to their accomplishments in space, these men were
elevated to a high moral position. They were granted prominent positions at parades and
festivals, quoted by journalists, featured in films and newsreels and, above all, held as the
example to which all young people should aspire. Journalist M. Sokolov wrote in
Molodaia gvardiia:

Today's youth are a great power. They will live under Communism. To do this,
all Soviet young people need to develop a strong spirit, infinitely loyal to the
leader and the Communist Party, such as the national heroes, Yuri Gagarin and
German Titov. Let the case of these remarkable young people become an example
for all Soviet boys and girls. 39
After the publication of the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," some
individuals even believed that the cosmonauts' success meant they must have been raised
upon the tenets of the "Moral Code." If mothers wanted their sons and daughters to
accomplish feats like those of Gagarin and Titov, then they should teach their children to
live by Communist morality.40
The two men, however, could not live up to their public personas. Communist
morality was based on ideals. It envisioned the perfect subject, willing to subjugate all
personal interests to the common good. Just as women were simultaneously supposed to
overfulfill their work quotas and devote long hours to raising their children, the image of
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an ideal man was also a contradiction. The Party wanted men to devote their lives to the
Party and work. Russian culture, however, equated masculinity with drinking. Both
Gagarin and Titov had difficulty bridging the two ideals. Gagarin missed the opening of
the XXII Party Congress after breaking his jawbone jumping out of a window. Titov was
involved in a string of drinking parties and car accidents, culminating in the death of one
of his passengers. Both incidents were kept secret.

41

The cosmonauts were tools of the

state. Their public personas served as an ideal toward which the common subject could
aspire and helped spread the moral tenets that would build the new Soviet man and the
future Communist society.
In addition to the scientific advances in the space program, growth in the
consumer goods industry allowed for an increase in consumerism. Consumption and
living standards gained a more prominent place in Party rhetoric during the 1950s,
promoting this accomplishment but also fearing its effects on the idealized austerity of
the Communist lifestyle. More and more families were moving into Khrushchevki, or
standardized, mass-produced, pre-fabricated apartment buildings. While these
apartments were hastily constructed and often of poor quality, they granted Soviet
subjects the possibility of a single-family apartment. Reid argues that the Party feared
that the small increase in the availability of some consumer goods, combined with singlefamily apartments, would turn women into crazed consumers. 42 Khrushchev included
austere aesthetics in his idea of "Leninist norms," hoping it would encourage people to
focus on function and rationality, not irresponsible consumerism. 43 Despite his attempts,
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Soviet subjects continued to take advantage of the opportunity to decorate their homes
with lampshades and useless trinkets, embracing the new availabil ity of these items in a
traditionally restricted consumer culture.
Some individuals viewed the growth in the supply of consumer goods as progress
along the path to building Communism, which involved making products more available
to Soviet subjects and improving people 's living conditions.

44

Aspects of the Third Party

Program echoed these concerns. Notes from February 1961 suggested "There should be
more attention paid to the principle of material and inoral incentives as the main method
45

of realizing the Communist principle of distribution."

Khrushchev agreed. At the

January 1961 Plenum meeting, he supported raising salaries, so that moral and material
incentives would encourage people to work more efficiently. "It is necessary that people
see and feel such material incentive. Does this contradict our principles? For
Communism to succeed, we must first take care of our people. What concerns people?
For a good job, for high quality work, there should be a good salary and material
incentives. This should not be forgotten."
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All of these advances pointed to the advent of a new era, seemingly distant from
the Party's Stalinist past and full of promise. Stalinism had violated the values of
socialism, but Khrushchev promised to restore Lenini st norms to Soviet society. Unlike
previous generations, the postwar generation perceived themselves as uncorrupted by
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Stalinism.
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Further~ore, along with the advances in housing and material goods, the

spectacular scientific advances in rocketry and space as well as the promise of mass
increases in agricultural production due to the Virgin Lands Campaign made it appear
that the Soviet Union was rapidly progressing towards the eventual construction of
Communism. In 1959, at the XXI Party Congress, Khrushchev publicly declared that the
Soviet Union had finally constructed socialism and began drafting a new Party
program.

48

With the guidance of the new Third Party Program, the Party and all of

Soviet society could overcome the anxieties towards the increased openness with the
West and the return of Gulag prisoners and begin to build the new Communist society.
The Third Party Program
The Third Party Program was designed to instruct each sector of Soviet society
how to progress toward Communism. The Communist Party used Party programs as a
form of Party platform to outline the Party's central values and ideals as well as define
goals to guide the Party's actions and decisions in the corning years. Vladimir Lenin
issued the first plan in 1903 at the II Party Congress, planning how best to mobilize the
working class for revolution. When the Bolsheviks had seized control of the country,
Lenin unveiled the second Party program. Presented to the VIII Party Congress in 1919,
it set out plans for the building of a socialist society. 49 The final step for the Soviet
Union would be the construction of a Communist society. Party leaders made plans to
draft a third Party program in the 1930s but instead adopted the Stalin Constitution in
1936. Efforts were again interrupted in 1939 by the outbreak of World War II.
47
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Following the war, a draft of the new program was commissioned under Andrei Zhdanov,
one of Stalin's chief subordinates. Completed in December 1947, the draft of the new
program called for increases in the standards of living as well as reduced state
involvement in subjects ' personal lives. These provisions were deemed unacceptable
under the Stalinist state. They would have forced the state to divert resources· from the
armaments industry as well as loosen its control over society. As a result, the new
program failed to materialize. so
Discussion of a third Party program began again in earnest in 1956. That year, at
the XX Party Congress, the Party called for the creation of the new program.
Disagreements in the Presidium, however, made it difficult to agree on a new official
ideology, especially in the wake of Khrushchev' s denunciation of Stalin. Following the
XX Party Congress, Khrushchev secured his power and removed his rivals from the
Presidium. His authority allowed him to choose the ideological message of the new Party
program and determine how the Soviet Union would build the future Communist society.
With sole control over the Party's direction, a new commission finally began work on the
Third Party Program.51
While Khrushchev technically led the drafting committee, the committee was
composed of Otto V. Kuusinen, Anastas Mikoian, Mark Mi tin, Mikhail Suslov, Petr
Pospelov, and Pavel Iudin, and was chaired by Boris Ponomarev. All of these men were
members of the Central Committee and fi ve - Kuusinen, Mi tin, Suslov, Pospelov, and
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Iudin - had served on th~ 1947 committee under Zhdanov.

52

This continuity lead to

some of the similarities between the two plans, in particular the strong emphasis placed
on increasing subjects' living standards and entrusting more power to collective groups in
society. 53 In addition to these men, at least one-hundred specialists from a variety of
field s worked for three years in various groups drafting different parts of the program.
The vast majority of the committee's comments on the Party program related to
economics. As part of building Communism, the program emphasized agricultural and
industrial.quotas. Work groups within the committee also discussed the automation of
industry and improved supply of products to factories and stores, feeling that without
these improvements it would be impossible to build Communism. 54
Khrushchev took care in instructing the committee on the purpose of the new
program. He believed that it should explain the role of society along the path to
Communism as well as stress the connections between life and the sciences. Society
would be molded into a morally upright and efficient unit. It would be devoted to the
Communist cause and would rely on individuals to reform each other into morally correct
Communists. Science would play a crucial role in the new society. Building
Communism would require increased industrial efficiency and better living standards,
both of which relied on advances in science and technology. Finally, he requested that
the committee be absolutely clear that Communism would not be anarchy. Instead,
Communist society would function because society would monitor itself. 55 The
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committee would design a program that would remain in effect for twenty years and plan
the path to Communism in the industrial, material, and moral spheres.
As part of writing the new Party program , the committee was also responsible for
drafting the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," a list of moral tenets to be
included in the program's section on ideology, culture, and education. Already by 1959,
the list of tenets had come to resemble its final shape. Members, however, continued
debating the exact wording of each tenet. The care with which these individuals chose
the wording of the morality code 's tenets illustrates its importance in the program and the
building of Communism. Each tenet would be responsible for shaping Soviet subjects
into better, more collectively minded, and harder-working people.
From 1959 to 1961, the tenets of the "Moral Code" continued to undergo slight
revisions. The popular phrase, "All for one, and one for all" was quickly added to the
tenet on collectivism, framing the idea of a collective mentality around the popular phrase
to make it more comprehensible for Soviet subjects.

56

Another draft included

"arrogance" in the tenet on intolerance toward careerism and parasitism, perceiving this
as equally detrimental to the Soviet economy's success. 57 Other contested phrases
included whether or not to remove "humane relations" from the tenet on respect, and if it
was better to hate enemies or simply to refuse to tolerate them, being unclear as to the
difference between hate and intolerance. 58 Finally, some members considered including
discrimination in the tenet on racism. 59 While none of these changes altered the
fundamental meaning behind the code's tenets, the authors nevertheless exercised great
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care in deciding how these ideals would be conveyed to the public. They wanted the
"Moral Code" to apply to each Soviet subject and guide them in moral self-reform.
Defining Communist morality was not an afterthought lost among industrial quotas, but a
fundamental aspect of the Communi st Party's plan to build a new society.
As the committee's work ended, Khrushchev began editing the final versions of
the program's draft. On 20-21 April and 18 July 1961 , Khrushchev dictated more than
forty-six pages of comments on the Party program. Most of the leader's comments were
merely editorial. Other comments, however, focused on establishing his own brand of
ideology and distancing himself from Stalinism. For example, he wanted to stress that
the dictatorship of the proletariat would become a people's state. Any discussion of
putting in place a dictatorship was sure to harken to Stalin and his cult of personality, a
comparison Khrushchev was keen to avoid. Khrushchev also emphasized that social
classes would no longer exist, another idea that had been present during the NEP era but
faded under Stalin. For Khrushchev, all of these revisions described a society built along
Lenin's ideals, not the denounced practices of Stalin.
Following Khrushchev' s revisions, the draft of the Party program was presented
to the Central Committee on 19 June, which was then prepared for a massive public
discussion of the program. 60 The period of public discussion and commentary on the
program had real significance for the Party. They did not intend simply to dictate the
program to .society but wanted to take the opportunity to hear what individuals thought
about the program, while also educating them on its provisions. In the weeks before the
program draft's publication, Khrushchev wrote, " What purpose is there in discussing the
project of the program? It is most of all in order to fam iliari ze all of the Party, all Soviet
60
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people, and the whole world with the project of the Program, to raise their hearts and
minds to the great inspirational prospects, which the Party is opening up before our
country in the coming twenty years." 61 It was important that every Soviet subject
understood the goals of the program and voiced hi s or her opinions on the provi sions.
Without their suggestions, the program would be out of touch with the rieeds of society,
jeopardizing the success of building Communism.
The Central Committee planned the program's propaganda, and its public debut in
particular, in great detail. First, the draft of the program would be published in the
journal Kommunist and in the main newspapers, such as Pravda, Izvestia, and

Komsomolskaia pravda, as well as in major regional newspapers. A thirty-minute
television broadcast from Moscow on 31 July 196 1, would announce the program 's
publication and read it in its entirety. Radio broadcasts would read the program in the
various national languages. Finally, on 3-4 August, the program would be published
outside the USSR in English, French, Arabic, German, and Finnish.
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Party leaders

hoped to ensure that news of the Third Party Program and its provisions would be known
throughout the Soviet Union and abroad, announcing to the world its intent to create a
new Communist society.
From 3 1 July - 15 September 1961 , the Party received hundreds of thousands of
suggestions from the public on a wide range of the program's provisions. Some
individuals wanted mo/ attention paid to the mechanization of industry, others spoke of
the need for more tractor stations, and still others advocated a new anti-religious
campaign. After reviewing the suggestions, a fi nal version of the program was compi led
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and approved at the XXII Party Congress. The final version of the "Moral Code of the
Builder of Communism," called for:
I . Devotion to the cause of Communism, love of the socialist Motherland and of
the socialist countries,
2. Conscientious labor for the good of society: he who does not work, shall not
eat,
3. Concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public
property,
4. High sense of public duty; intolerance of actions harmful to the public interest,
5. Collectivism and comradely mutual assistance: one for all and all for one,
6. Humane relations and mutual respect between individuals: man is to man a
friend, comrade, and brother,
7. Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, unpretentiousness and modesty in
public and personal life,
8. Mutual respect in the family, concern for the upbringing of children,
9. Irreconcilability towards injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism, and
profiteering,
10. Friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the USSR, intolerance of
national and racial hatred,
11. Intolerance towards the enemies of Communism, peace, and freedoms of
nations,
12. Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all
63
people.
With the program approved and released, the Party began its efforts to spread the lessons
of the "Moral Code" and reform society.
The Role of the Collective in the Building of Communism
Discussions surrounding the "Moral Code" focused on the role of collectives in
reforming their own members and those around them. Khrushchev stressed that the
solution to moral problems was not through legislation, but through everyone helping
each other. "We, comrades, must and w ill d/everything we can in order to educate

[vospityvat '] people properly, to help them get back on their feet. All this will be done,
for we must do it w isely. We cannot just kill a man who has gone mad. It would be
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fooli sh. On the other hand, the corrupt, incorrigible people we wi ll punish mercilessly,
not only for them, but as a warning to others. " 64 Leaders of the Komsomol echoed
Khrushchev's assertion that the "Moral Code" would become the new Jaw of life. " The
central committee of the Komsomol believes that the most important, honorable task of a
young production collective, is the assertion of the 'Moral Code of the Builder of
Communism' as the law of life of every young person, every boy and girl."
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In the eyes

of both Khrushchev and the Komsomol, society, especially the collective, would become
the chief agent of reform.
During the Khrushchev era, the collective evolved from small work groups into
the chief regulators of morality and ethics. Kharkhordin analyzes how leaders and
scientists in the postwar Soviet Union looked to the collectives in planning the making of
the new Soviet man. Collectives would police individuals' social and moral behavior and
supervise their development as Communist subjects. Due to the collectives' pervasive
presence, "there is no single Big Brother, but there are many bigger brothers. There is no
single apex, where 'punitive and decision-making power culminate, but a network of
surveilling peers, to whose arbitrariness in the enforcement of virtue the individual
submits. "'66 Unlike under Stalin, when the police were responsible for regulating
society, Khrushchev' s collectives would strive to police the moral behavior of every
Soviet subject. As such, a 196 1 Jaw ensured that everyon1 belonged to a collective.
Kharkhordin continued, "Instead of a chaotic and punitive terror of the Stalinist years, he
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[Khrushchev] wanted to see a relentless and rational system of preventative surveillance.
We might add that he largely made this dream come true."

67

Journalists, propagandists, and Party members all stressed the value of the
collective in reforming society. N. F. Ivanovich of the Moscow propaganda division
spoke to a meeting of city Party committees on the need to promote collectives. He
argued that the collectives were much more effective than newspapers or journals in
influencing a person' s vospitanie, or moral upbringing. People needed real life examples
of how to be good Communist subjects. 68 . Printed advice literature would only reach
people who actively sought it out, but relying on the collectives would ensure that
everyone learned the tenets of the new " Moral Code." In order to build Communism,
Party leaders envisioned the members of the various collectives acting as agents of
reform and vospitanie for all of Soviet society.
Educating others, however, first entailed educating oneself. On 12 September
1961, Sergei Pavlov, secretary of the Komsomol, chastised Komsomol members for not
observing the norms of Communist morality. It would be impossible to reeducate others
if the members refused to serve as models of Communist behavior. Each member needed
to work seriously with his or her own education in order to reform society.69 V.
Kolbanovskii expanded this call to society at large in his suggestion submitted to the
Party. He stressed that the Paity was relying on a form of "se~pbringing and selfeducation," believing that each individual should study and understand the code for
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himself in order to serve as a bett~r example for others. 70 If society was to build
Communism, then everyone needed to play a role for the good of others. This meant not
only serving as a model for other members of society but also within one' s own family.
Every individual should teach the "Moral Code" to his or her own family. The family
could serve as a micro-collective. Efforts for a happy family were·synonymous with
efforts for a happy society. By entrusting groups in society with the task of reforming
society, Party leaders were confident that the program would be a success and a
Communist society would be built.
Despite all of the public input on the program's provisions, the Party's efforts to
educate the public on the values of the program and the "Moral Code," and the promise
of life under Communism, the Third Party Program failed to achieve its lofty goals. By
1970, the Soviet Union was projected to surpass the United States in industrial
production. Agricultural production was also supposed to increase 250% by 1970 and

350% by 1980. In 1980, however, Communist society had not been realized.
Distribution of goods failed to increase to the levels predicted in the program. The
promise of a new era and the optimism of the 1950s could not transform the Soviet Union
into the efficient, altruistic country the leaders had envisioned.
Furthermore, it is unclear how well Soviet subj ects actually received the new
program. While the program did serve as a new sense of autho\

for the Party

following the denunciations of Stalin, " the legitimization and mobilization factors were
linked to specific figures and dates, and a fail ure to provide them would undermine the
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Soviet leadership's legitimacy." 71 Hi storian Yurii Aksiutin conducted a retrospective
poll in 1998 on how the Thaw generation had felt about the Party program following its
release. At the time, roughly 52% of the population believed in Communism. Of those
individuals, only 37% believed that the plan would be achieved exactly as dictated. 72 The
public discussion surrounding the " Moral Code" demonstrates that whether or not people
full-heartedly subscribed to the provisions of the Party program, they were eager to
discuss the program's ideals.
Regardless of whether or not Soviet subjects truly believed in Communism or
thought that the Third Party Program would be achieved, their comments on the "Moral
Code of the Builder of Communism" provide valuable insights into Khrushchev-era
society. Their suggestions were not just about the ideal Communist society that would
arrive in twenty years. Each letter, article, or draft revision worked to promote the
author's own social ideas for the present. The reforms and changes of the Khrushchev
era demonstrated that aspects of Soviet society could change, but for some individuals
society needed to move in a different direction. Whether arguing for taking women out
of the workplace to devote more time to domestic labor, or promoting greater state
intervention in the family at the expense of personal fr edoms, some individuals seized
the opportunity for public debate surrounding the "Moral Code" to advocate illiberal
policies during a period otherwise known for its liberal reforms.
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CHAPTER III
THE IDEAL SOVIET FAMILY
This chapter addresses the commentary surrounding the ideal Soviet family and
proper vospitanie of children in the " Moral Code of the Builder of Communism." It will
first address the morality code's tenet on vospitanie, placing the·tenet within the context
of the Soviet Union's evolving family policies as well as the growing prevalence of
divorce and single parenthood. The primary focus of this chapter, though, is the range of
suggestions the public submitted for improving the tenet on vospitanie. This chapter will
argue that the diversity in ideas on vospitanie was the result of the Thaw's confusing
nature. Leaders in the center called for public participation by organizing a large public
campaign and publishing articles on vospitanie in various periodicals. The ambiguous
policies of the Thaw demanded public participation and interpretation in order to
decipher their meaning. Individuals reacted to the state's often-contradictory messages
by promoting their own opinions as to who was responsible for matters of vospitanie.
Some individuals wished to grant more power to social institutions. Others believed that
showing concern for vospitanie entailed ensuring that parents took an active role in the
upbringing of their children. The ambiguous nature o~both the moral tenet and

vospitanie itself forced a public debate on the meaning of the family, illustrating the
diverse range of opinions in Soviet society.
Furthermore, these suggestions demonstrate the presence of an illiberal current in
Khrushchev-era society. While many of the state's actions appear to have promoted
great~r state and pedagogical involvement in people's moral education, the rising rate of
divorce and delinquency forced individuals to question the moral framework of Soviet
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society. Some individuals in society fe lt that parents possessed an irreplaceable influence
over their children and state-sponsored institutions of vospitanie had contributed to the
moral crisis. They wanted a form of vospitanie with less state interference, similar to
other aspects of the Thaw that permitted small measures of personal freedom. Other
individuals, however, felt that the moral crisis in society demanded more state
intervention in the family, arguing that this was the only way to shape the new Soviet
man properly and continue on the path to Communism. They valued the state's role in

vospitanie and used the Party's call for public discussion to advocate less freedom in
family life and grant greater authority to the other agents of vospitanie: teachers and
collectives.
Crisis in the Soviet Family
The Khrushchev period featured a rising divorce rate as well as low attendance at
boarding schools and childcare centers. It became apparent to those both inside and
outside of the Party that there was a family crisis in the Soviet Union. The state stressed
that proper vospitanie required a strong family. Vospitanie is an untranslateable term that
broadly refers to a child's upbringing or moral education. Proper vospitanie would raise
a cultured, polite, knowledgeable, and morally sound individual. During the era of the
New Economic Policy (NEP), the state had taken radical measures to weaken parental
control of vospitanie, seeing the fami ly as a remnant of bourgeois society.
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NEP-era

divorce laws spawned the emergence of postcard divorces, in which individuals simply
needed to notify their partner of the divorce by mail. The rising cost of children' s homes,
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the increasing presence of homeless children, and falling birthrates, however, caused the
state to reevaluate its stance on the issue and grant greater responsibility to the family.
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Under Stalin, the state began promoting marriage, motherhood, and a nuclear
family - stressing the family's responsibility for vospitanie over that of teachers or the
collectives, noting that families could perform this function cheaper and more efficiently
than the state. Making families the primary agents of vospitanie required a shift in moral
education, which had previously stressed an individual's relation to society and the state.
Stalinist morality, as a result, also evolved to stress the role of the family in vospitanie, a
trend that continued into the post-Stalin period. 75 Operating within this framework,
Soviet subjects used the discussions surrounding the Third Party Program and the "Moral
Code of the Builder of Communism" to share their opinions on the family's role in

vospitanie. Incorporating ideas from both the NEP and Stalin eras, these individuals
searched for the best way to address the family crisis and strengthen the vospitanie of
future generations.
One way in which the state strove to create a more productive family unit was
promoting the institution of marriage by making divorce a challenging process.
Beginning in the 1930s, in order to present a petition, couples first had to pay a fee to the
local people's court. Then, an announcement was put in the-Ju-ca-I newspaper declaring
the couple's intent to divorce. After this was completed, a judge would hear the case and
attempt to reconcile the.couple. Finally, if they were unsuccessful, the couple could
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appeal to a regional court, where, if granted a divorce, the couple would pay another large
fee . Despite this arduous process, however, divorce was on the rise. 76
Deborah Field finds that between 1955 and 1965, the number of divorces in
Moscow city courts grew 270%. In her article, " Irreconcilable Differences," she
concludes that the number of divorce suits filed and divorces granted rose throughout the
Khrushchev period. In the year the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" was
released, 1961 , Moscow city courtjudges granted 22,76 1 divorces. This is compared to
only 8,462 divorces granted in 1953.
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An increase of this magnitude in the number of

divorces reflected poorly on the state of Communist morality. Propagandists argued that
citizens needed to put aside their personal romantic interests in order to maintain strong
and stable family units. Field argues that these propagandists viewed divorce as selfish. 78
According to them, anyone requesting a divorce was forsaking his or her social
obligations for a passing emotional whim.
Judges differed from the Party in their views on divorce. Decrees dating from the
1940s had encouraged judges to reconcile couples and grant a divorce only if the case
was strong and the continuation of the marriage posed a serious threat to the vospitanie of
others. In the early 1950s, though, legalists began working on more lax divorce laws.
Despite the state 's promotion of public goals and Communist morality, individuals filing
for divorce felt their cases were valid. Field finds that divorce applications from the late
1950s cited differences in character, loss of feelings, or negle c ~he strong emphasis
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on emotions and private relationships denied the dominance of public goals over personal
interests.
The rising divorce rates show that Soviet fam ilies did not match the ideals
espoused in Communist morality. Donald Raleigh's oral history of the Soviet baby
boomers provides a detailed account of how families operated in the Khrushchev era.
Postwar Soviet society encountered an extreme imbalance in the ratio of men to women.
Many women were left as single mothers. Those who were married continued to work,
hoping to provide a more financially stable household for their families. Raleigh finds
that 85% of mothers, single or married, between twenty and fifty-five years of age,
worked. Despite the large number of women working outside the home, only 13% of
preschool children attended the state-operated nurseries in 1960.80 As a result, Raleigh
notes the dominant role of grandparents, particularly of the grandmother or baba, in
raising children. Many of Raleigh's participants were raised by their grandmothers in
multi-generational homes or went to live with their grandparents in the countryside for
the summer or even multiple years at a time. 81 He finds that these families viewed statesponsored childcare centers as a last resort due to limited availability and poor quality.
According to Raleigh's research and analysis, state institutions during the 1950s and
early 1960s did not succeed in replacing the multi-generational home as the primary
institution of early childhood education.
The " Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" inclf°d one provision on the
Soviet fami ly. In the draft of the code published in late July 196 1, Tenet Eight called for
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"mutual respect in the family and concern for the vospitanie of children."

82

By calling

for "concern for the vospitanie of children," the creators of the "Moral Code"
demonstrated the crucial importance of vospitanie for society. With Khrushchev's pledge
to achieve Communism, society had become responsible for creating the new Soviet man.
Raising children according to the "Moral Code" would ensure the Soviet Union's success
in building the future Communist society. Furthermore, the phrase " mutual respect in the
family" implied that men and women would take equal responsibility for children and the
home. In the Soviet Union, women were responsible for domestic chores as well as
raising the children. The continued stress on "mutual respect" in this tenet signaled an
attack on male chauvinism and sexist attitudes toward women's work, calling on men to
take more responsibility in the home. Under Communism, according to the "Moral
Code," men and women would respect each other equally, both in the home and in
society.
This ambitious reform of family life was perplexingly vague. In other tenets of
the code, the authors specified exactly which qualities would or would not be tolerated.
For example, another tenet called for "Honesty and truthfulness, simplicity and modesty
in social and personal life," referring to the need to be honest and truthful with others and
also value an aesthetic lifestyle in the home.83 In comparison to this specific list of
characteristics, the tenet on vospitanie does not specify who was to fulfill which roles in
the family, who was responsible for raising the children, how much respect children
should give to their parents, or how thi s renewed attention would manifest itself in
society.
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The tenet on vospitanie was ambiguous on family relations and responsibility for

vospitanie from its earliest drafts. A version of the tenet from November 1959 called for
"the purity [chistota] of family relationships, love and mutual respect between spouses,
parents, and children."
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Less than a month later, however, the tenet was changed to

read simply, "pure [chistye] family relationships," omitting who and what constituted
these relationships. The use of the word "chistota," or later "chistye" was incredibly
vague, potentially meaning "proper" or "ordered," depicting a clean family relationship
void of chaos and conducive to good vospilanie. 85 A draft of the moral code from 1960
removed the tenet in its entirety, relying instead on the values enumerated in the
remaining tenets and the value placed on humane relations to regulate personal
relations.86 Subsequent drafts and revisions reinserted the tenet but continued to
emphasize a vague definition of the family. The code's authors intended these tenets to
be vague in order to apply broadly to Soviet subjects' lives and personal situations. Over
the course of their revisions, however, their attempts to broaden the scope of the tenets
also stripped them of any clear meaning. The lack of clarity in regard to " mutual respect"
and "concern for vospitanie" allowed individuals to promote their own various
interpretations of a single moral tenet.
A Strong, Separate Family
The suggestions submitted to the Party demonstrate how the debate opened by the
"Moral Code" gave voice to diverse ideas on family and vospitanie. Whi le some
individuals saw the answer to the collapsing family in greater state involvement, as had
been envisioned during the NEP era, Party authorities knew that they could not destroy
84
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the fam ily, even though they continued to perceive it as a harbinger of old ideas and a
source of corruption for the youth. Some individuals interpreted the call for greater
concern for vospitanie to mean that fami lies could exercise greater autonomy from the
state. Parents could be trusted to raise their children properly without the state
intervening. For them, the family's role in raising children was irreplaceable and the
moral issues plaguing society could be remedied by strengthening the family unit.
Other Soviet subjects' suggestions promoted a strong Soviet family separate from
the state. As Raleigh showed, for many people a strong separate family included
grandparents. The multi-generational household was the standard for many Soviet
subjects. Working women were unable to devote the long hours needed to finding food
and goods in the Soviet Union's scarce consumer culture. As a result, grandmothers
assumed a respected place in the Soviet household. They were able to tend to the
children and stand in store lines while the mother and father were at work. V. E.
Vinogradov, A. Vinov, and eleven other individuals wanted to expand the tenet on

vospitanie to read, "Mutual love and respect in the fami ly, caring for elderly parents and
raising children."
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A group from the Kirov region included the following comment in a

list of suggestions forwarded to the Party: "concern for the vospitanie of children and
elderly parents." 88 Both suggestions emphasized that grandparents should remain part of
the Soviet fam ily. They were attacking the issue of abandonment, in which Soviet
subjects refused to care for their parents or children. Grandparents were part of the
family unit and, as such, these individuals felt that a call for mutual respect in the family
and concern for vospitanie served as a signal for all Soviet subjects to incorporate
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grandparents into their own families and care for them. While other individuals attacked
the presence of grandparents in Soviet families, in the opinion of these individuals the
ideal Soviet man or woman did not cast off elderly parents, who were supposedly

backwards and corrupting influences, but cared for them and welcomed them into their
families.
A major obstacle to this strong, nuclear family, however, was the prevalence of
single mothers, challenging the Party's ideal of the two-parent household . In 1961 , the
existing family law only designated paternity for children born of legally married parents.
Dating back to 1944, this law encouraged men and women to marry, while also allowing
men to engage in extra-marital affairs without the risk of being forced to provide
monetary child support. Women were no longer able to seek monetary support through
the court system. Furthermore, even if men wanted to acknowledge and support children
born out of wedlock, there was no legally binding route available to them. In an effort to
I

increase birthrates and strengthen the institution of marriage, Soviet authorities had
created an opportunity for discrimination against such children. 89
Suggestions for the " Moral Code" show that some people perceived the family
law as morally wrong. Single mothers worked long hours, struggled to support their
families, and had little time left to devote to raising their children. Helene Carlback' s
work on family law in the Khrushchev era demonstrates the widespread concern
regarding single mothers and the idea of the promiscuous man. With growing
urbanization, high mobility, and a skewed sex ratio, Soviet men were increasingly having
multiple families. Women fe lt that they had been deceived by these men and then
89
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abandoned, fo rced to raise the children on their own. It was not only women who
suffered as a result of these men. Fatherless children were stigmatized by society. Some
pedagogues even worried that these children would be stunted morally.
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The

commentary on the "Moral Code" shows that individuals felt this phenomenon was
having dire consequences for Soviet society.
In regards to this, one man, identified as Bykov, suggested "The Moral Code of
the Builder of Communism needs to include the words 'strongly condemns all those who
leave the family, refuse to raise children. "'91 Bykov went beyond simply calling for
individuals to be better parents. He wanted to punish anyone who refused to take
responsibility for his or her family, especially the promiscuous man. Ideally, state
institutions would be able to compensate for the lack of a parent by caring for the
children while the mother or father was at work. Bykov, however, felt these children
would still be at a disadvantage throughout their lives. Children lacking two parents,
according to Bykov, would be deprived of attention, affection, and even monetary
support. Parents who neglected family duties went against Communist morality by
failing to show "concern for the vospitanie of children." Bykov argued that parents had a
role in raising their children that the state could not fulfill or replace.
Similarly, K. V. Ivanova oflzhevsk was also morally opposed to individuals
refusing to support their families. She hoped to add to the "Moral Code" a sentence
stressing that, "a Party member should be morally steadfast in life and serve as a good
example of personal Communist relations in the family, strengthening the family unit of
Communist society in every possible way, and regarding those who disregard the fate of
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their own children or refu se to pay child support as incompatible [nesovmestimym] with
the ranks of Party members."92 Ivanova' s suggestion went beyond Bykov's
chastisement of those who left their families. She accused Party members of ignoring the
existence of these child evaders and, as a result, failing to show the proper concern for
the family and vospitanie.
Both suggestions show the strong desire to strengthen the Soviet family as a
separate, irreplaceable unit, located in a two-parent home. Unlike the Party, these
individuals did not want to substitute parental influence with that of the state and social
institutions. Instead, people should work to defend the idea of a nuclear family. Fathers
should be forced to take responsibility for their families because a two-parent household
was ideal for raising children. Similarly, Soviet subjects needed to value grandparents
because the multi-generational household created the best environment for obtaining
goods, caring for children, and maintaining the home. The individuals promoting these
suggestions hoped to create a future society in which vospitanie would be liberalized,
granting the family small measures of freedom from the state.
Intervening in the Family
While the suggestions above discussed the value of the family in matters of

vospitanie, other individuals stressed the need for more state control and intervention to
ensure the proper upbringing of the future Communist society. In some extreme cases,
individual s wanted to deny the family any involvement in a child's vospitanie. P. I.
Grebenok went so far as to ask that matters of vospitanie be entrusted solely to the state.93
Similarly, V. I. Lisen of Makeevka, a coal mining and industrial center near the Black
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Sea, called for children to be raised by social institutions, such as boarding schools or
nurseries, not by fa milies.94 Their suggestions imply a desire to return to the family
policies of the 1920s, when leaders believed that children could be best raised in social
institutions. These sites of vospitanie, such as boarding schools and kindergartens, would
save the future generations from the influences of children's backward famili es.
Elena Valina, a journalist, explained just how corrupting the influence of a

backward mother could be in the absence of any state intervention. The mother in
Valina's article preferred reading in the monastery to working on the collective farm or
caring for her child. Despite the suggestions of the other collective farm workers, the
woman not only refused to send her child to a boarding school, but also took the child
with her to the monastery to read the Bible.95 The mother was preventing her child from
becoming a good, moral Communist. Similar to ~he actors in Bittner's study of
Moscow' s Arbat region, Grebenok, Lisen, and Valina interpreted the messages of deStalinization as a call to return to NEP-era policies. Stalin had promoted the role of
mothers in child-rearing, but this group of individuals believed that by eliminating
parental influence on children, society could better shape individuals into the future
builders of Communism.
These individuals made their comments in light of Khrushchev's call for the
increased construction of boarding schools in 1956. Khrushchev announced the plan in
connection with his general education reform, striving to rriake the educational system
more practical and more connected with the means of production. Proponents of
boarding schoo ls argued that these full -time institutions would improve society. In their
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opinion, many parents lacked an adequate Communist upbringing and, as a result, could
not raise their children properly. Boarding schools would also serve as a leveling device
for students coming from families of different educational backgrounds. Finally,
advocates stressed the value of state institutions in efforts to instill a collectivist mentality
in the youth. Nuclear families typically had few children and, due to chronic shortages
and the time-consuming nature of women's domestic responsibilities, these children
generally were not close in age. State institutions would train children to work together
with their classmates, teaching skills that would be of great use later when operating in
their professional collectives. 96 These concerns became even more pressing in light of
the moral panic seizing society. Petty hooliganism and drunkenness appeared to be on
the rise. Kelly notes that the Khrushchev period featured a return of the idea that crime
was the result of poor vospitanie. Boarding schools ensured that children would be taken
off the street and given proper Communist vospitanie.
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These men wanted complete

state control over matters of vospitanie and felt that limiting the family's influence on

vospitanie would create better Soviet citizens.
Despite the strong hope that boarding schools would become the state's solution
to issues of vospitanie, school construction failed to meet state expectations. In 1960,
only 600,000 boarding schools had been completed in the Soviet Union. Initially, the
plans had called for 1,000,000 boarding schools. Provisions in the boarding schools were
scarce. Food was monotonous and students were typicall y given one set of clothes.
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Children were given one coat every four years and tw~ pairs of tights every tlvee years.
By 1962, only 400,000 pupils had enrolled in boarding schools in Soviet R~ssia.
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Slow

construction, limited resources, and higher enrollment fees prevented boarding schools
from taking control of children's vospitanie.
The Party believed that building more kindergartens and nurseries would allow
mothers and fathers more time to work while still ensuring that their children received a
proper education. The committee members charged with compiling the draft of the Party
program remarked on 8 February 1961, "We need to raise the issue of combining
boarding schools with single-shift schools with extended days, and to link this issue with
the problem of the public education of the younger generation and the strengthening of
the family and its role in children's vospitanie in the higher forms ofrelationships
between parents and their children." 100 Their remarks suggest a balanced approach to the
family. Under no circumstances did they want to destroy the family or completely
remove parents' influence, as Grebenok, Lisen, and Valina had proposed. By combining
parental influence with the state's institutions, the committee felt children would gain a
better overall upbringing and grow into stronger Communists. Another individual, P. V.
Kuznetsov, agreed that the family was part of vospitanie, suggesting to the Party that they
"strengthen the sentence regarding the responsibility of Communists for the condition of
the fami ly."I0 1 His suggestion echoed the committee's goal of granting responsibility for

vospitanie to state institutions, parents, and Communist society as a whole.
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While many indi viduals accepted the role of parents in children's vospitanie,
some were not pleased with the continued presence of grandparents in the Soviet
household. Clunukov, a man from the Tambov Party committee, was horrified that the
future builders of Communism were being raised by supposedly backwards, or
uneducated and uncultured, grandmothers. He felt more state intervention would save
these children and give working mothers an alternative to the baba. Chmukov wrote in
response to the limited supply of public nurseries and kinderga1tens, "In the absence of
these conditions, our working mothers are forced to give their children to random
grandmothers, who to our misfortune, disagree with us on the issue of raising children.
And occasionally, these children, who were placed in the care of grandmothers, grow up
with different manners and desires."
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Despite Chmukov's disapproval, the limited

number of childcare centers and the need of families to have a grandmother, an individual
capable of standing in lines throughout the day searching for goods and watching the
child, ensured that grandmothers would continue to function as an essential part of the
Soviet family.
Childcare centers may have been limited, but day schools guaranteed that children
would come into contact with educated, cultured, and Communist agents of vospitanie,
especially due to their connection with the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations. Both
organizations were closely allied with the aims of the Party. Following the publication of
the program draft, authorities called on the leaders of both organizations to spread the
tenets of Communist morality. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Komsomol
organization, Secretary Sergei Pavlov called for better training of Komsomo l members
still in the school system , saying, "The main objective of the Komsomol school groups is
- RGASPI, f. 586, op. 15, d . 82, I. 93.
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to struggle for a profound knowledge, for the education of students in the spirit of the
Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. "
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These suggestions demonstrate the close

connections between Party and social organizations. Membership in the Komsomol was
not just an after-school or summer activity. Both organizations actively sought to shape
their members into good, strong Communists. As the tenet decreed, everyone should
show concern for the vospitanie of others. The dominant role of the Party and the
Komsomol in society meant that members were not only to give lectures on proper
morality, but also to serve as role models and intervene to better others' vospitanie.
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While the Komsomol organization felt it should play an active role in children's

vospitanie, some individuals also believed that a parent's influence on his or her child
was irreplaceable. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, Pavlov
argued against vospitanie in boarding schools. He felt that by eliminating family and
social influences, children were not learning as much about the world around them or
how they should behave. 105 The Party merely supplied one element of a proper

vospitanie. In order to show a proper concern for others' vospitanie, Pavlov suggested
combining the efforts of the Party and Komsomol organization with those of teachers,
parents, and neighbors. He felt that without the influences of these groups, children in
boarding schools would feel isolated from the world and, later in life, would be unable to
relate to their fellow Communists. Both Pavlov and the proponents of boarding schools
wanted to provide the best vospitanie possible for the future generation. However,
Pavlov's strong belief in the role of society and the family in an individual's vospitanie
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led him to argue against the invasive and extreme approach of boarding schools in favor
of a more balanced approach.
A published story about a schoolboy named Tolya serves as another example of
the benefits of a balanced approach to vospitanie. While a parent's influence was needed,
groups such as the parents' committee existed to ensure that parents provided the best

vospitanie possible. Tolya's account examines the merits of the collective mentality in
the parents' committees. Tolya was performing poorly in school, arriving in a messy
uniform, and consistently failing his lessons. His teacher discovered that all of these
issues were due to the boy's new stepmother. The author of the article stressed that the
stepmother was decidedly against Tolya for some reason. She succeeded in convincing
the father to distance himself from his son, resulting in the fami ly's failure to care for the
boy and raise him properly. Throughout the article, the author repeatedly placed the
blame on the stepmother for failing to care for Tolya properly, while no discussion took
place as to why the father willingly agreed to forsake his own son. In the teacher' s
opinion, women were the agents of vospitanie, not men. Her attitude toward the
stepmother illustrates the strong gender divisions in matters of vospitanie. Tolya's
teacher fe lt she needed to intervene to address Tolya's basic needs and took the issue
directly to the parent 's committee. 106
After a lengthy meeting, another family volunteered to take the boy in and care
for him . The article does not indicate whether or not the state compensated this family in
any way for their charity, which resembled a form of foster care. Kelly's analysis of
childhood in Soviet Russia indicates that increases in living standards during the
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Khrushchev period allowed more fami lies to take in foster children. Kelly is clear to
note, though, that fosterers took in children out of philanthropic interests, not as a source
of extra income. It was only by the 1980s that the state gave fosterers financial support
comparable to the amount spent on children in state institutions. 107 It is unclear, then,
why fam ilies in the Khrushchev era began to foster children. The film Sud'ba cheloveka
implies that it is connected with the horrors of World War II. 108 Based on a popular
novel by Mikhail Sholokov, the film features a solider whose life has been devastated by
the war. In the final scene, as the soldier is reflecting on the devastation he has
witnessed, he finds a young war orphan on the side of the road. The two then bond over
their mutual fee lings of loss, and the soldier adopts the boy. His story became symbolic
of many people in post-war Soviet Russia. The war devastated families, orphaning
children while others saw their children die from starvation or bombardment. Adopting
or fostering a child allowed individuals to heal after the war and also help children who
had lost everything. Whatever this particular family's personal motivations for fostering
Tolya, the fact that they took responsibility for the boy in light of the chronic shortages in
food and clothing in Soviet Russia demonstrates their personal dedication to collective

vospitanie.
Once in his new home, Tolya began to do well in school. He came to class every
day clean and well dressed. Furthermore, he was attentive in classes and quickly caught
up with his fellow classmates. The author of the article called these committees a new
form of family, one that was best prepared to intervene in fami lies' lives and better raise
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the "new man of Communist society." 109 A bad family could hold an individual back
from reaching hi s true potential, a concern shared by advocates of the increased
construction and utilization of boarding schools. By granting power to this collective,
however, the parents' committee was able to show their concern for the greatest good for
society and placed Tolya in a proper home.
The goal of this teacher to provide her students with good influences both at home
and in school was shared by others in the educational system. V. Grechishkina, one of
Sem 'ia i shkola' s journalists, stressed the need for parents to be good examples for their

children. Schools could not hope to work against poor influences at home, especially if
parents continued to lie, drink, or otherwise jeopardize the success of Communist
morality.

110

Sem 'ia i shkola also published a letter written by a teacher asking parents to

become more active in the school system. She hoped that her efforts would help her
students' parents become better role models. In her letter, she invited the parents to plan
trips to local museums, organize tours of their workplaces, teach the girls to bake or
prepare a meal, or teach the boys about simple electrical work. The teacher informed
Sem 'ia i shkola that roughly 40% of these parents offered to help her class, most donating

their Sundays for excursions or discussions of their personal wartime participation. After
a number of weeks, the children remarked to the teacher how thankful they were that
their parents had volunteered their time. The children were happy that each week
brought something new and exciting, but the teacher was more pleased knowing that her
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actions had helped to bring parents closer to their children, bettering the level of

. . 111
. t11e home. Ill
vospztanze
Despite the strong presence of Pioneer and Komsomol groups in the schools, the
teacher discussed above felt that bettering the moral development of her students required
improving their relationships with their parents. By asking parents to volunteer, she
ensured that her students would spend a day with their parents, providing a good role
model, who would teach them about their Communist past, the collectives at the various
factories in their town, and also general life skills. Similar to the story of the boy Tolya,
this teacher promoted an interventionist interpretation of vospitanie. While the state and
parents could not properly raise children without each other, this teacher's role as an
educator and agent of vospitanie granted her the authority to intervene in family relations.
The accounts of both teachers underline the entangled nature of public and private life in
the Soviet Union. Public debate on vospitanie opened the family up to criticism and
intrusion. The task of raising the builders of Communism was so vital that educators and
pedagogues needed to assist parents on properly raising their children.
The parents' committee, which played a prominent role in Talya's story, was
designed to be an open space, where people could help each other raise better families.
Sem 'ia i shkola believed that people needed to utilize this resource better. Some parents,

however, were afraid to discuss their family's faults. One mother, in particular, was too
ashamed to ask for help in stopping her son's chronic drunkenness.
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Drunkenness was

a widespread problem. An individual from the Kaluga Party organization, named
Laskina, cited the exampl e of Kupriianov, a twenty-three year old man. Kupriianov's
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family had allowed him to associate with stilyagi and drink too much. Had the family
asked for help, Laskina argued that it might have been possible to correct the young
man's behavior. Since they preferred to keep their problems to themselves, however,
Kupriianov slowly began to arrive late to work and eventually stopped showing up
entirely. 113 Both accounts served as cautionary tales against raising children without the
help of the parents' committee.
These groups worked according to the principle of the collective. Parents met to
discuss issues they were having in their own families and also spread material on proper
parenting techniques. These suggestions stemmed from the emphasis the authors of the
"Moral Code" placed on the collective' s role in the building of Communism. Members
of a parents' committee in the Moscow region wanted the code to dictate that parents
should become active in their children's school.

114

Participation in these organizations

was voluntary. Regardless, the members of the Moscow organization felt so strongly that
these groups played a crucial role in improving the vospitanie of children that they
wanted participation included in the new moral code. In their opinion, a moral
Communist and active participant in the building of Communism would value the
collective and work to apply the principles of the collective to all aspects of life.
Conclusion
These suggestions have shown that ideas varied immensely on exactly how to
show concern for vospitanie. Reacting to the ambiguous messages from the state and
seizing the opportunity to voice their opinions, individuals in society seized the Party's
invitati on fo r public parti cipation and submitted a broad range of suggestions for
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remedying the Soviet family. In their suggestions, though, was also a discussion of what
constituted the Soviet family. For men such as Grebenok, the family was outdated and
needed to be replaced by state institutions such as boarding schools and kindergartens.
Other individuals, such a Bykov and Ivanova, wanted to strengthen the nuclear family by
promoting two-parent households. All of these diverse and at times contradictory
suggestions drew upon the same ambiguous tenet from the "Moral Code" to show
"concern for the vospitanie of children" and on the renewed urgency in building a
Communist society.
The commentary surrounding the "Moral Code" further supports the illiberal
interpretation of this period. Some segments of society used the opportunity for public
participation to argue against the reforms of the Thaw era. In an otherwise authoritarian
state, the discussion of the "Moral Code" allowed people to voice their frustration with
the state of Soviet society and the current direction of the state. Individuals, such as those
mentioned above, were shocked by the changes taking place in parenting and marriages.
It appeared that the family was collapsing. People wanted to address this crisis, but their
personal ideas of the family shaped their varying solutions and prevented any unanimous
agreement. The notion of "family" meant different things to different people, whether
arguing for more or less state involvement in the vospitanie of children. While most
suggestions argued for a balanced approach to vospitanie, appreciating the benefits of
both parental influence and state intervention, other suggestions valued eliminating
parental influence entirely for complete state control of vospitanie. Instead of a period of
ambitious, liberalizing reforms, the commentary surrounding the tenet on vospitanie
illustrates a period in which a large segment of society called for an increase in control of
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family life. T he period of public commentary and discussion allowed individuals from
all levels of Soviet society to bring domestic and fami ly matters into the public discourse,
granting each of them the authority to intervene in the personal lives of others.
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CHAPTER IV
WOMEN'S WORK
This chapter addresses the public commentary surrounding women's role in the
workplace. It will first discuss three tenets of the " Moral Code of the Builder of
Communism" that dealt with an individual's relation to work. Understanding the
conditions plaguing Soviet industry will demonstrate the pressing concerns for improving
relations between workers, as well as the need to increase the efficiency of Soviet
industry. The bulk of the chapter will discuss suggestions from Party members and
ordinary Soviet individuals. Similar to the discussions of vospitanie, the variety of
opinions surrounding the "Moral Code" also extended into views on women's work.
Many individuals proposed suggestions for increasing women's involvement in society,
improving women's work training, and monitoring men's behavior toward their female
comrades. This chapter will show that the ambiguous and participatory nature of the
Thaw initiated a public discussion of women's role in the workforce, allowing some
individuals to argue that women should have a smaller public presence and to promote
more repressive policies than normally associated with the Thaw. These individuals
believed women had important, valuable work to do in the home and if the state refused
to support women's domestic work financially, it should at least grant them time to fulfill
their role in the household.
The State of Soviet Industry
Chronic shortages plagued Soviet industry. Supplies consistently arrived late to
factories, leading to a recurring cycle of low production at the beginning of the month
and frantic overtime at the end of the month in an attemJJt to fulfill the state's quota.
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Furthermore, machines often broke down due to their poor construction, inexperienced
operators, and overwork. The rushed nature of Soviet industry also resulted in the spotty
standardization of replacement parts. Factory machinists spent a considerable amount of
their work day refashioning parts from other factories in order to keep their own
machines running, leading to even more wasted time. All of this led to resentment on the
part of the workers. They could not control their work environment, use collective action
to increase their wages, or stop the chronic end-of-the-month storming. As a result, as
Donald Filtzer argues, many workers purposely arrived late to work, limited their
productivity, and left early for breaks. 115 Workers' frustrations continued to weaken the
Soviet Union's industrial output, making attempts to forge more harmonious work
relationships even more crucial.
In addition to the general unease about working conditions, women in particular
were becoming increasingly frustrated at their lack of free time. In 1959, as the code's
authors were compiling early versions of the Party program, the average Soviet subject
worked five to six eight-hour shifts per week. In addition to their time spent at work,
however, Soviet women also devoted a large amount of their day to domestic work. The
ideal mother took care of the shopping, preparing meals, cleaning the home, and tending
to the children. The average Soviet working woman spent anywhere from three and a
half to five and a half hours each day doing domestic work, as the domestic burden fell
almost exclusively on women.

116

Despite state promotion of public services aimed at
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lessening women's work in the home, the strongly patriarchal nature of Russian culture
emphas ized a woman's role as domestic caretaker and mother. Men relaxed or drank
with friends in their free time, leaving women with few other options to ease thei r
burden. Women continued to work their shifts at the factory only to return home and
spend hours tending to the household.
Filtzer argues that Soviet women's work was a burden that encompassed all
aspects of their life. Men saw women's subordinate status in the home and transferred it
to the workplace. 11 7 Historians have long noted that Soviet women were kept in lowskill, low-payingjobs. 118 As a result, women dominated the textiles industry, production
of consumer goods, and monotonous work, such as brick making. Most women began
their careers in these areas. However, women's responsibilities at home often prevented
them from obtaining any extra training. Evening and correspondence courses took time
that these women needed to spend shopping, cleaning, and caring for their children.
Lynne Atwood studies accounts of Soviet women who entered traditionally maledominated fields, such as welders, engineers, pilots, and crane operators. Such positions
required a certain degree of skill and were also perceived as dangerous. Despite
depicting women in male-dominated occupations, these published accounts still stressed

would spend on average more time than working women on domestic chores because they were
on pension, nor does it include young girls, busy with studies or incapabl e of hel ping wi th some
hou sehold tasks . The studies were intended to focus on the dynamics between men and wo men in
a shared ho usehold. (Filtzer, Soviet Workers and de-Stalinization, 194-206)
11 7
Donald Filtzer, " Wome n Workers in the Khrushchev Era" in Women in the
Khrushchev Era ed. by M. Ilic, S. E. Reid, L. Attwood (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmi llan,
2004), 29.
118
For more information on women in Soviet industry see: Wendy Goldman, Gender and
Jnduslry in Stalin's Russia (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Melanie Ilic,
"B iding Their Time: Women Workers and the Regulation of Ho urs of Emp loyment in the 1920s,"
in Gender in Russian History and Culture, 1880-1990 ed. L. Edmondson (New York, N Y:
Pal grave Mac millan, 200 I), 139-157 ; Gail W. Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society: Equality,
Development, and Social Change (Berkeley, CA: University of Californ ia Press, 1978).

65
the,gender-div ided nature of Soviet industry. The accounts mentioned the women' s frai l
bodies, small stature, fear of machines, and reliance on male co-workers fo r success.
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These accounts were attempting to naturalize gender discrimination by showing women
as biologically weaker than men. If women were in fact weaker, then men needed to
protect and shield them from dangerous jobs, situations, or environments. This form of
logic served only to further entrench patriarchal and paternal attitudes in Soviet and
Russian society. Atwood's argument supports previous interpretations of women's
restricted role in Soviet industry, but she also demonstrates the affect of gender roles on
women's efforts to advance in their careers.
The state's rationale for differentiating between men and women in certain
industries was not simply a matter of gender ideals but orig inated with the belief that
som e jobs were hazardous to a woman's health. Industrial occupations could be
dangerous for all workers due to the repetitive strain of heavy lifting, smoke, chemicals,
and risk of accidents. Officials and common individuals alike, however, expressed
concern only for women's health. Due to their supposedly weak and frai l nature, women
needed to be protected and sheltered from these hazards. Regardless, som e women opted
for these more dangerous positions because they resulted in early retirement and an added
pension.
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The state also took steps to limit the work strain on pregnant women in

particular. Expectant mothers could not be forced to work a night shift or on holidays.
They were also guaranteed three months of pay during their four-month maternity leave,
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during which their position would be held for them.

121

The workforce was gendered and,

whether for valid health concerns or gendered stereotypes, women's presence in the
workplace became a hotly debated issue in the discussion surrounding the "Moral Code."
Commentary on Women' s Labor
Three tenets of the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" addressed an
individual ' s work and relations with others. One tenet praised "collectivism and
comradely mutual assistance: one for all and all for one." The code also valued "humane
relations and mutual respect between people: man to man - friend, comrade, and
brother." 122 By focusing on men, brothers, and the masculine form of friend [drug] , the
authors of this tenet were operating within the strong patriarchal nature of Russian
culture. Besides the word "comrade," which can apply to either gender, the other words
of this tenet specifically excluded women. The gendered structure of the Russian
language led the authors of the "Moral Code" to reinforce patriarchal and paternal
attitudes subconsciously, while also forcing women to structure their suggestions for
greater work equality in this patriarchal framework. Finally, the code called for
"Conscientious work for the good of society: he who does not work, does not eat" [kto ne
rabotaet, tot ne est]. 123 These tenets contained politically charged language. The phrase,
" he who does not work, does not eat," in particular, was popular worldwide. As one of
the most popular Soviet propaganda slogans, it was featured on many posters as well as a
collection of porcelain plates in the early 1920s. Lenin focused on the phrase in an article
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on famines, calling it a basic principle of socialism.
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The phrase continued to serve as a

motto for Soviet life through the late Soviet period. All of these tenets functioned as
ideals or grand aims toward which Soviet subjects should aspire - creating a more
harmonious, efficient, and productive Soviet society and workforce.
The "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," as part of the Soviet Union' s
self identity as a worker's society, placed such a high value on people's relation to work
that another tenet specifically vilified anyone found guilty of the crime of parasitism. As
the tenets above indicate, individuals were not supposed to work simply for their own
benefit, but rather for the good of society and the improvement of the work experience of
those around them. Parasitism had been a source of concern under Lenin and Stalin; but,
in the early 1950s, officials unleashed a new anti-parasite campaign. They defined a
parasite as someone who either only held a job for appearances while living off the
income from a different profession - such as the poet Joseph Brodsky - or a person who
carried out no form of meaningful work and begged for money.

125

The growing number

of students refusing to find jobs after graduation also perplexed individuals in society.
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These young adults were supposed to be the builders of Communism, yet they refused to
provide any form of productive labor. Reacting to these concerns, the tenets of the
"Moral Code" stressed the virtues of hard work and work for the good of society, without
which Soviet society could not hope to achieve Communism.
Throughout the Party's month-long call for suggestions on the " Moral Code" and
the new Party program, individuals across Soviet Russia submitted their opinions on how
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best to forge more harmonious relations at work. Similar to the di scussions of vospitanie,
the vague wording of these tenets allowed them to apply to a greater portion of society
but also created a window through which people could argue for their own ideas.
Focusing on the relations between men and women in the workplace, some individuals
used the period of public participation to argue for different safety regulations, changes in
the work schedule, or even different work roles for men and women. Their comments
were part of a much larger effort to improve Soviet society. As this thesis will continue
to demonstrate, however, not everyone believed that improving society meant continuing
the same policies of increasing women' s role in the workplace.
The commentary surrounding the code's tenets on work, collectivism, and mutual
respect questioned the extent to which women should be involved in the workforce.
Messages from the Party promoted the full involvement of women in society and the
workforce, while also praising motherhood and celebrating women with large families.
As a result, the public's suggestions mirrored both official messages. Some individuals
argued for women to have greater access to jobs, receive vocational education, and be
treated with respect during work. Others wanted to return to a more pro-natalist stance.
They argued that mothers should not have to work as long as men. Domestic chores and
childrearing, in their opinions, were necessary to fulfill the program's goals, as the
builders of Communism needed to be raised in good households by caring parents. Just
because some women worked fewer hours at the factory did. not mean that they were
doing any less work for the Communist cause. As shown with the commentary on

vospitanie, these suggestions promoted intervening in women' s Ji ves and keeping women
in the home, demonstrating the presence of illiberal currents operating alongside the
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Thaw in Soviet Russia. Amid the chaotic changes of de-Stalinization, some individuals
in society abandoned the goal of women' s liberation and placed a greater value on
women's work in the home.
Efforts to promote women's domesticity were a reaction to the unobtainable
ideals to which Soviet women were held: The ideal woman was simultaneously a
worker, mother, and cultured woman. There were simply not enough hours in a day to
accomplish all of those tasks, especially with the large amount of time women would
need to devout to scavenging for goods to prepare meals for their families while attending
lectures or concerts in the evenings. Few women could match this ideal. N ina
Khrushcheva, Khrushchev's wife, for example, did not work. While she had been
employed at a Moscow electric lamp factory in the early 1930s, she quit her j ob
following the birth of her son, Sergei, in 1935. After teaching an occasional course on
Party history or English for a few years, Khrushcheva quit working entirely.

127

Even for

the wife of the General Secretary, similar to many other Party wives, any attempt to
become the ideal Soviet woman was filled with contradiction and ambiguity.
These contradictory messages are visible in the Party's commentary on the
"Moral Code." Nikita Khrushchev wrote in April 1961 that every individual should work
in order to be a part of society, and also teach others how to relate to work in a better
way. 128 Active participation in Soviet society was inextricably linked with labor.
However, during the early months of 196 1, authors of the moral code began including the
idea of working according to one's abilities. One draft called for " Hard work for the

127

.

Taubman, Khrushchev, 112- 113.
1?8
- RGA SPI, f. 586, op. I, d. 201 , I. 30.

70 benefit of society from each according to his contribution." 129 It was shortly ti1ereafter
changed to " Conscientious labor for the good of society: from each according to his
abilities." 130 These ideas continued to stress the strong relationship between society and
labor but also admitted that not everyone was capable of performing the same work.
Elderly men and women could not be expected to perform the same tasks as a twenty
year old man. Similarly, a handicapped individual would be unable to complete certain
assignments. Stipulating that each person should work according to his own ability
created a socially acceptable space for individuals who could not work but were still
supported by the state. However, it also opened an area of contradiction that would be
used to promote ideas supporting mothers.
While promoting work, the program's authors also debated the duty of the state to
mothers oflarge families. In a version of the draft from 1958, the authors commented
" We need to establish conditions under which mothers of large families will be able to
focus all of their attention on their children' s upbringing. For women with one to two
children, set a shorter working day without a reduction in pay."

13 1

A year later, the same

authors amended the provision to specify that allowing mothers of large families to focus
so much attention on their children was "an important public matter."

132

These

individuals did not differentiate between a mother of one child and a mother of four
children. In both cases, they argued that mothers should be given time off from work
without any reduction in pay, creating a form of compensation.for the expense of raising
children.
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Promoting Equal Treatment
The opinions discussed above demonstrate that even within the Party, there was
no cohesive opinion on the proper role of women in the workforce. Similarly, throughout
the month-long public discussion of the Party program and the " Moral Code," no singular
opinion emerged from the public suggestions. Like the authors of the program and the
morality code, individuals based their opinions of women's role in the workplace on the
ideas of "all for one, one for all," "work for the good of society," and "mutual respect
between comrades." These tenets allowed people to discuss women's liberation from the
household, the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace, and the need to balance
women's responsibilities at home and at work.
S. G. Berezovskaia and 0. K.hvalebnova, both of Moscow, submitted their
suggestions in favor of full social involvement of women. They believed that the code
"should completely eliminate the underestimation of women's competencies and abilities
[ ... ] Women should be involved in all areas of the economy, culture, and science with
the exception of those that are harmful to a mother's health." 133 Their opinion was
similar to that expressed by the program 's authors. Women should be incorporated into
the workforce. However, as the moral tenet stated, each woman would work according to
her physical abilities and only in areas that would not be dangerous to her health.
Berezovskaia and Khvalebnova were echoing the excuses of women's frailty and need
for patriarchal control. While pushing for greater social equality between men and
women, they continued to operate within the patriarchal structures of Russian society.
The suggestions of Berezovskaia and Khvalebnova stem from the early Bolshevik
idea ofliberating women from domestic slavery. Some of the a1ticles published in thick
133
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journals on the draft of the Party program took a much stronger stance on women's
liberation. They prai sed women's roles in the revolution, commenting, "Without women
there would not have been a revolution."

134

The journalist, Elena Kononenka, continued

by praising the code's authors for devoting attention to women's liberation, reaffirming
ideas of utopianism from the NEP era. "It is no coincidence that the draft of our Party's
program so strongly orders the elimination of the remnants of women's unequal status in
the home for increasingly active and creative participation in social work and
activities." 135 Kononenka was clear that women should be freed of their added
responsibilities in the home and with child rearing. In her opinion, having a child should
not force a woman to give up her career. She was relieved to see that the program's
authors had addressed this in their goals for the future Communist society. Another
article from Rabotnitsa commended the program for its attention to women's issues,
specifically the commitment to promoting and improving public services to relieve
women's responsibility for domestic chores. "The path is clear: society should take these
tasks from women." 136 Both articles stressed the liberation of women with the help of the
Party and public services, hoping that the successful building of Communi sm would
finally bring the full involvement of women in society.
Despite the emphasis these women placed on public services, the level of success
for these services in the Khrushchev era is highly debatable. Donald Filtzer's study of
how women workers spent their time finds that the use of public services occupied only
5% of the total time spent on household chores. 137 Regardless, the Soviet press
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applauded the state's efforts to improve public services. Members of the program
committee argued that creating various types of children's homes, summer camps, and
cafeterias would improve relations between men and women by freeing women from the
home. 138 Any attempts to free women from domestic work hinged upon the availability
of alternative methods of cleaning and food preparation.
An article in Agitator described the ways that Communist society would make,
and in some cases already had made, women's lives easier: better and cheaper cafeterias,
cheaper household appliances, shops for mending clothes and shoes, summer camps for
children, care centers for children, boarding schools, free school uniforms, and free
school lunches. 139 The state made efforts to provide these services for women but
chronic resource shortages and the continued emphasis .on heavy industry and the arms
race frequently resulted in the failure of these public services. L. Karpinskii, a
Komsomol secretary, supported the efforts to free women from housework. He
suggested more cafeterias closer to work sites, which would save women from waking
early to prepare breakfast. Providing women with more cleaning machines would also
speed up household chores. 140 All of these individuals believed that the building of
Communism would create a new life for women, in which "her life is meaningful and
comprehensive, not limited to the confines of family interest."

141

Unlike the commentary above, largely found in the officially sponsored thick
journals, the public suggestions solicited by the Party focused more on relations between
men and women at work to achieve equal treatment of the sexes. A group from the Altai
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region wanted the program to include a provision for the " promotion and social elevation
of women, intolerance to manifestations of uncomradely relations and attempts to detract
from her dignity and role as an active builder of Communism."

142

Another individual,

named Shirinov, proposed that the Party "add to the Moral Code of the Builder of
Communism such items as: a) intolerance for violators of the rules of socialist relations
and b) the struggle against manifestations of bourgeois ideology and subservience."

143

Both ideas were echoed in a suggestion from T. lu. Tikhonchuk, also speaking for the
social elevation of women, intolerance of improper behavior towards women, and the
"intolerance of any attempts to detract from her [a woman's] dignity and role as an active
builder of Communism." 144 The recurrence of these ideas illustrates their pervasiveness
in society and the hopes of these individuals that "comradely mutual assistance" and
"humane relations and mutual respect between people" discussed in the "Moral Code of
the Builder of Communism" would improve relations between men and women at work.
A major component of uncomradely relations at work was the common use of the
term "baba" against women workers. While the term most commonly refers to a
grandmother, it is also a derogatory term for women, accusing them of being old,
unattractive, lacking any style or culture, and generally being uneducated. Elizabeth A.
Wood studies ideas of the baba in revolutionary Russia. She argues that baba applied to
illiterate, backward women, who were seen as the opposite of the comrade.
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An article

in Pravda from August 1961 criticized the current work relations be.tween men and
women. Specifically, it condemned the continuing sexism at work as some men
142

RGANI, f. I, op. 4, d. 30, I. 67.
RGANI, f. I, op. 4, d. 69, I. 16.
144
RGANI, f. I, op. 4, d. 30, I. 20.
145
E liza beth A. Wood, The Baba and the Comrade:·Gender and Politics in
Revolutionary Russia (B loomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), I.
143

75

continued to use the term "baba" when referring to their female coworkers and refused to
ask them any questions, especially in cases when women were in positions of
authority. 146 Including a provision on " uncomradely relations" in the moral code would
provide a foundation from which to attack the use of the word "baba" against women,
allowing women to participate more in the workforce.
Involving women in the workforce, and society in general, required providing
women with more education and training. In Soviet Russia, however, training was
closely allied with industry and work. A journalist, I. Spiridonov, commented, " the most
important means of Communist education is to educate through work." 147 The Party used
the collective to shape individuals into better workers. Similar to the idea of a parents'
collective, a workers' collective served as a place for workers to share ideas, discuss
matters of workers ' ideology, and help new workers become a part of the factory.
Journalist 0. Morozova extolled the efforts of one collective in reeducating a woman by
the name of Liuba V. , a supposedly amoral and unfocused mechanic. Thanks to the
collective's efforts, Liuba not only became a better worker, but she also became a
devoted mother and daughter.
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In addition to providing a more hospitable environment

for women to work, these individuals argued that supporting women in the collectives
would further help them become active builders of Communism.
Elevating the Domestic Sphere
The opinions discussed above have all pushed for greater equality between men
and women in the workforce - emphasizing women' s abilities and education as well as
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their ri ght to be active builders of Communism. In contrast to these suggestions, other
indi viduals used the period of public discussion to place more emphasis on women's
work in the home. They valued the work that women performed in the home and refused
to turn domestic responsibility over to public services. Though varying in their suggested
methods, all of the recommendations below valued rolling back some of the established
measures aimed at increasing women' s public presence in order to return to a more
separate domestic sphere.
Much of the commentary argued for partially removing women from the
workforce. These individuals wanted to limit the number of hours worked by women.
One-hundred-and-forty-seven residents of Gor'kii signed a petition requesting a
reduction in women's working days from eight hours to four or six hours. Additionally,
they wanted to grant women a one-month break each year, two days off per week, an end
to night shifts, and younger retirement ages.

149

Another individual, V. S. Kozlov of

Moscow, went as far as to call for a four-hour workday and a 50% reduction in salary. 1so
A woman wrote to Pravda relating how excited she was to see that the Party p~ogram
addressed women. Specifically, she was glad to see that women would be spared some
time at work in order to spend more time raising their children. Hopefully, she thought,
this would ease women's burden. 1s1 These individuals felt that women had valuable
duties outside of work that were beneficial to society. As a result, women should be
granted time to complete their domestic role and not be required to work shifts as long as
men.
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Another suggestion for showing greater appreciation for women 's work involved
financially compensating mothers for the time spent raising their children. V. I. Shunkov
wanted more discussion of the condition of families under Communism included in the
code. He suggested adding a provision on state aid to mothers with multiple children. 152
Similarly, a letter from the Stalingrad region suggested subsidizing the time and
resources mothers devoted to raising children until their child reached the age of sixteen.
Each mother would receive ten rubles for one child, fifteen rubles for two children, and
twenty-five rubles for three or more children. 153 An unidentified individual from the
Cheliabinsk region wanted mothers to be given five rubles per month per child, no matter
what the mother's salary or marital status.

154

In both cases, providing benefits to mothers

to offset the cost of raising a child acknowledged motherhood as a valuable form of work.
Women, as mothers, were providing work for the good of society according to their own
abilities. These individuals argued that this labor deserved some form of compensation
from the state, whether in terms of a shorter workday or monetary benefits.
The illiberal elements of the Khrushchev era also emerge in public suggestions
promoting women's valuable role in the domestic sphere. In her discussion of the
Khrushchev kitchen, Reid notes the state's efforts to decrease women's domestic burden
through more household cooking and cleaning appliances and the introduction of a more
scientific design for the kitchen.
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As L. Karpinkskii suggested above, it was hoped that

developments such as cafeterias, laundry centers, and household appliances would lessen
the amount of time women needed to spend in the home, allowing them to take a more
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active role in society and the workplace. According to these policies, easing a woman' s
domestic burden would increase her public presence. Others, however, felt that society
needed to return these chores, along with women, to the home.
The following suggestions highlight efforts to lessen the burden of women's
domestic chores while also allowing women to retain their presence in the home. While
the Soviet Union denied people the right to refuse work, it was possible for individuals to
use the call for public participation to petition the state for a reduction in working hours.
The Third Party Program promised that under Communism, everyone's work hours
would be reduced. Increased efficiency and mechanization would allow factories to
complete their quotas in less time. The suggestions submitted during the period of public
commentary, however, specifically targeted reducing women's work hours in order to
allow women more time to fulfill their domestic duties. By modifying domestic gender
roles or introducing more efficient methods for cleaning or preparing meals, individuals
hoped to preserve the domestic realm and women's place in it.
Gender roles placed the vast maj ority of housework on women. Filtzer's analysis
of how men and women spent their time in the Khrushchev era demonstrates the strong
feminine nature of housework. Adult working women spent over twice as much time on
domestic work as men. T he women of this study spent on average fifty-seven minutes
shopping each day, compared to twenty-two minutes from their male counterparts.
Similarly, while men spent only thirteen minutes a day preparing food, for women it was
one hour and thirty-eight minutes. When looking at tending to the home and the mending
of clothing, the gender dynamics become even more pronounced.
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The extra time

women devoted to the household prevented women from taking advantage of educational
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opportunities, attending meetings, or socializing with friends - all of which were
activities easily accessible to men. Without assistance from their husbands in preparing
the occasional meal or entertaining the children for an afternoon, women were also less
likely to achieve higher positions at work or take part in social or Party organizations.
Atwood finds some examples of women forging equal relations with their
husbands, typically featuring men helping with domestic work if their wife was busy with
work or an exam. She argues, however, that this was often the result of women
specifically asking for assistance, while other women passively accepted the full burden
of the household. Most articles advocating increased male participation in the home in
these thick journals promoted masculine chores, such as taking out the trash or even
chopping wood if necessary, not fixing dinner or washing the dishes. 157 Through a more
equal division of the domestic chores, women could continue to fulfill their roles as
workers but also know that their family was well fed and provided with clean clothing.
In light of poorly-supplied public cafeterias and laundry services as well as the challenges
of altering gender roles in the domestic sphere, women were left searching for a way to
balance their public and fami lial obligations.
Atwood 's argument that some women requested assistance from their husbands is
supported by a suggestion from N. Pazaeva and V. Belova. They wrote to the Party and
suggested that the Party should " include in the moral code an order on the equal work of
the husband and wife in the famil y." 158 These women did not want to entrust their
domestic chores to public services. Instead, they felt that husbands should help in the
household and share the burden. Like industrial labor, they believed that housework was
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also for the good of society. As a result, in the eyes of Pazaeva and Belova, men and
women should share an equal responsibility for maintaining the home. The ideas these
two women were proposing called for deeply interventionist policies. They hoped to
control the relations between husbands and wives in their own homes. While their goal
was to alleviate women' s domestic burden, it also further entangled the public and private
spheres.
Some women simply refused to give up their domestic role. They took pride in
their domestic skills and wanted to continue cooking meals for their families. Cooking
served as a form of work that was good for society. K. Efimova, an engineer from
Moscow, wrote to Pravda that she enjoyed cooking a hot breakfast and lunch for her
family, as well as preparing the occasional large meal to entertain guests. She enjoyed
her position in the home. Not only would she refuse to stop preparing these meals, but
she also wanted support from the Party. Specifically, she requested a greater selection of
frozen foods so that she and other women could still cook but do so more efficiently.
This would allow women to fulfill their duties at work and also be able to provide warm
meals for their families. 159
Efimova was not alone in her interest in frozen foods. Two years earlier, in 1959,
the American government had showcased its technological advances in consumer
products to the Soviet public. At the American exhibition in Moscow's Sokolniki Park,
Soviet subj ects saw automobiles, tasted American soft drinks, and toured an American
home, complete with futuri stic household appliances. 160 Visitors learned about powdered
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mixes capable of making a cake in minutes.

161

They also witnessed the expanding

market of frozen foods. 162 Clarence Bridseye had pioneered the American frozen foods
industry in the late 1920s, and by the late 1950s the industry had expanded to packaged
meat, juice, vegetables, and individual dinners.
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In 1959, Americans spent $2.7 billion

on frozen foods, 2700% more than they had a decade earlier. Companies marketed frozen
foods as the way to liberate the housewife from her drudgery. 164 The American
exhibition drew massive crowds in Moscow and news spread of the exhibition's displays.
Unlike the Americans, though, who pursued foods to free women from the home,
Efimova called for increased supplies of frozen foods to allow women to maintain their
place in the home while also working.
Similarly, an article in Pravda from August 1961 discussed the increasing number
of women working on the collective farm. The article stressed that these women wanted
to be able to prepare nice meals for their families more than just once a week. Like
Efimova, the author of the Pravda article believed that women wanted to prepare warm
meals for their families in order to be good mothers - a role which would in turn better
society. The article suggested that the state should give women time off from work so
that they could cook for their families. 165 Instead of promoting the expansion of public
services, the author of thi s article wanted the state to devote energy and resources to
allowing women to work and still perform their own domestic labor.
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These women wanted the state to support them in their longing to fulfill their
roles both in the workforce and with their families at home. They felt that there was
some value in a family eating a warm breakfast and lunch together in their own home and
that other women would surely also want to provide this for their families. Like the
suggestions above, these women felt that their performance of domestic chores served a
valuable social purpose. Efimova and the collective-farm workers felt the state should
support their domestic role in society - providing support for them but not intruding.
Dinners should remain a time shared by members of a household, not an area for the
state. Work for the good of society, for these women, meant allowing them to continue
fulfilling their domestic responsibilities and maintaining a strong presence in their homes.
Conclusion
Reacting to the confusing messages from the state during the Khrushchev era and
the state's invitation for public participation, Soviet subjects expressed a variety of
attitudes on women's proper relation to work. Some individuals agreed with the state's
policies for increasing women's public role - advocating for more public services and a
crackdown on sexism in the workplace. Others instead placed a greater value on the
work that women completed in the home. They requested that women be granted more
time off from work or be compensated for time spent raising their children. Despite the
diversity of opinions, all of the suggestions were based on the tenets in the "Moral Code
of the Builder of Communism" and the ideas of good relations between comrades and
good-natured work for the good of society.
As seen in the commentary on vospitanie in the previous chapter, people's strong
desire to limit women's opportunities and structure their lives solely around the family
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reaffirms the ex istence of repressive elements operating parallel to the Thaw. Women
left the factory after working a full eight-hour shift to perform hours of chores at home.
Attempting to satisfy both roles left women unable to fully dedicate themselves to either.
Despite the long-held Bolshevik goal of granting women greater involvement in society,
individuals within Soviet Russia argued not only for the appreciation of women's
domestic labor, but also stressed the need to decrease women's work shifts and provide
them with monetary support so that they could continue providing their much-needed
services for the Soviet fami ly.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This thesis has shown that the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism"
opened a small window for public discussion in an otherwise authoritarian Soviet society.
Individuals debated different notions of the ideal Soviet woman as well as a woman's
proper role in the workplace and in vospitanie. Their discussions emerged in response to
the ambiguous nature of the morality code's tenets. The code called on Soviet subjects to
be cultured, hard-working, industrious, and devoted to the motherland, all while also
helping each other, demonstrating concern for the vospitanie of others, and showing love
and mutual respect in the family. These provisions created an impossible ideal - a
woman who should be simultaneously a worker, mother, and cultured subject. This
thesis has argued that the period of public discussion and call for suggestions created an
opportunity for individuals from both the top and bottom of Soviet society to debate
current gender ideals and propose possible solutions to the moral crisis plaguing society.
Through their suggestions, these individuals demonstrate the participatory nature of the
Thaw, as each promoted his or her own version of the ideal Soviet woman.
The suggestions discussed in this thesis have also challenged the interpretation of
the Thaw as a period of liberalizing reform. Historians of this liberal Thaw have focused
primarily on the small measure of increased expression during the Khrushchev era.
Artists and writers experi enced more freedom from the censors, allowing abstractionist
exhibits and the publication of books that strove to portray Soviet life realistically.
Furthermore, historians have stressed the role of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" as a
defining moment in the Thaw. He criticized Stalin's cult of personality, the attack on the
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Red Army during the terror, and the leader's seemingly arbitrary style of rule. Under
Khrushchev, the Soviet Union would operate under the principle of socialist legality,
using law and procedure to ensure proper rule. Scholars of the Thaw have argued that
these reforms ushered in a relaxed era of greater expression, limited state intrusion, and
less policing of social norms. The suggestions examined in this thesis, however, have
shown that this was not always so. Some individuals were opposed to the liberal reforms
of the Thaw and wanted greater state intrusion into personal areas and more power for the
collectives as institutions of invasive public policing.
The need to exert greater control over society was in response to a perceived
moral crisis in Soviet society. Divorce rates were rising dramatically, increasing almost
270% in the course of a decade. 166 The mass Gulag amnesties had brought anti-Soviet
elements back into contact with the morally-upright and cultured Soviet society.
Hooliganism and parasitism appeared to be an increasingly common phenomenon.
Campaigns were unveiled to combat both hooliganism and parasitism, but the prevalence
only served to emphasize the corrupt moral character of Soviet youth. Individuals were
also concerned about the negative effect of foreign influences on Soviet society.
Khrushchev's efforts to attract foreign allies by opening up the Soviet Union had also
brought society into contact with Western culture, undermining Communist morals and
ideals. 167 Party leaders, collectives, and individuals in society all agreed that cultured
Soviet society needed to be preserved. The ambiguity emanating from the center, .
however, created confusion and disagreement on how best to proceed.
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Individuals promoting more intervention as a solution called on the state to enact
more intrusive and repress ive policies. Schoolteachers, Party members, Komsomol
leaders, and members of the collectives would all serve as agents of reform, aiming to
provide good role models throughout people's lives. The Khrushchev era featured a
renewed reliance on the collective. A special force from above was no longer responsible
for policing social control. Instead, the state called on everyone to police and reform
each othe_r. Relying on the collectives, the Party hoped that no one would be able to
escape the reforms. Intervening in individuals' lives would ensure that people were
transformed into proper Communists.
This thesis has emphasized the ambiguous and participatory nature of the Thaw as
a way of extracting the different discourses present in Soviet society. Individuals were
unsure about the meaning behind de-Stalinization and the other ambiguous reform
campaigns. Specifically, they disagreed if these reforms indicated a return to the ideas of
the NEP era or a continuation of existing policies. Ambiguous policies demanded public
participation throughout the Khrushchev era. The Party openly solicited public
discussion of the tenets of the "Moral Code," creating opportunities for individuals to
promote their own views on Soviet society.
The ambiguity of the Thaw is evident in the tenets of the "Moral Code of the
Builder of Communism." For example, the code called for greater concern for

vospitanie, but it was unclear from whom exactly this concern should come. It could be
charged to teachers, collectives, families, neighbors, or even grandparents. Each variant,
however, would have a different effect on the type of vospitanie people received. The
code aiso called on every Soviet subject to work, while stipulating that each should work
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according to hi s or her own abilities. The tenet did not clarify if work was defined as
employment or simply socially-beneficial labor. If it was the later, then it could be
argued that women's work in the home qualified as work, granting them either financial
benefits or reduced hours at their place of employment. In an attempt to make the "Moral
Code" apply to as many people as possible, its authors had made it difficult for
individuals to comprehend the meaning behind its tenets.
As a result of this ambiguity, Soviet subjects needed to debate the true intent of
the "Moral Code." Party leaders designated a period of public discussion primarily in
order to educate the public. The campaign, however, also allowed individuals to forward
their own opinions on the code. While the suggestions rarely succeeded in changing
specific tenets of the code, the campaign did serve an important purpose for Party
officials. It allowed them to discover what Soviet subjects thought about Communist
morality as well as preserve the tradition of soliciting public input, which dated back to
the Stalin Constitution of 1936. Through the commentary, people were able to debate the
true intent of the vague tenets and suggest any additional tenets they believed needed to
be included. In the end, only two tenets were added to the final version of the code and
the vast majority of the suggestions were not applied to the code. The ideas individuals
promoted, however, illustrated their interpretations of the path to Communism, the
message of de-Stalinization, and the needs of society.
Studying the commentary surrounding the "Moral Code of the Builder of
Communism" provides a better understanding of the values held by Soviet subj ects under
the Khrushchev era. While the Party program described a future society, individuals used
it as a means of discussing issues present in their own lives. Individuals called for greater
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attention to atheism. They proposed a tenet in the "Moral Code" suggesting a renewed
campaign for atheism in the Soviet Union, showing their support for the atheist campaign ·
that had been in effect since 1959. 168 Others were grateful that the code had promoted
intolerance toward parasitism, hoping to end the phenomenon of young people, in
particular, refusing to work while taking resources from the state. In addition to atheism
and parasitism, others also wanted to encourage people to exercise greater devotion to the
state, whether through allegiance to the Party, support for other socialist countries, or the
promise to defend the motherland. Individuals' desire to see these matters addressed in
the "Moral Code" demonstrate their concern for these issues and the potential threat for
future generations.
This thesis has focused specifically on the debates surrounding vospitanie and
women's work. Both areas center around discourses on proper gender ideals and the
definition of the family. The suggestions illustrate how men and women viewed each
other's roles within Soviet society. They show which traits, characteristics, and gender
roles individuals felt should be elevated above others. Each individual was able to
forward his or her own opinion on which aspects of the impossible feminine ideal would
be promoted. Prioritizing a woman's role as a worker, mother, or cultured and sociallyactive woman not only highlights the individual's views on women, but also one's
understanding of the Thaw.
The debate surrounding vospitanie was largely a response to the moral crisis in.
Soviet society. Ri sing divorce rates and the increasing phenomenon of promiscuous men
had a poor influence on children. In order to respond to the crisis and show the proper
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concern for others' vospitanie, however, people first needed to agree on how to define
"the family." For some individuals, the fam ily was a nuclear group, featuring a mother, ·
father, and their respective children. The fam ily could also include grandparents, as they
were useful in maintaining the home and gathering goods. Families could also be defined
more broadly, including social elements, slich as teachers' and parents' committees, in
the raising of children. Defining the family all owed individuals to promote their own
suggestions for remedying the moral crisis and improving others' vospitanie, whether that
involved advocating for more or less state intervention.
Proponents of a stronger family unit suggested less state intervention in the
family, seeing the solution to the ·moral crisis in promoting good relations within the
family. They called on Soviet subjects to take responsibility for their own families. The
family unit was a necessary part of a proper vospitanie. Promoting households with two
parents, both of whom loved and cared for their children, would ensure that children were
raised with good morals, a dedication to work, and proper social skills. To accomplish
this, these individuals suggested lowering the divorce rate as well as refusing to tolerate
child evaders or men with multiple families. As an added bonus, such proposals would
also lessen the prevalence of single mothers. Advocates of these theories believed that
parents and grandparents would provide loving homes and raise their children properly.
They viewed the "Moral Code" and its call for both "concern for vospitanie" and "mutual
love and respect in the family," as a validation of their suggestions.
The ambiguity ofthe "Moral Code" also allowed people to argue for greater
intervention into the family and more control over people's vospitanie. Such individuals
believed that fam ilies needed guidance from the collectives in order to raise children
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properly. Vospitanie was too important to allow potentially backwards or uneducated
parents to jeopardize future generations. Parents' committees, teachers, and collectives
would serve as the primary agents of vospitanie. They would intervene in family life to
shape and control others' vospitanie, either by removing children from poor influences,
as in the case of Tolya, or encouraging patents to serve as active role models, as the
teacher writing to her students' parents hoped to do. Teachers and members of parents'
committees would instruct parents on how best to raise the future builders of
Communism. For these individuals, showing concern for vospitanie meant policing and
correcting the vospitanie of those around them.
Debating gender ideals in the family also required agreeing on women's proper
role in society and the workforce. Tenets of the "Moral Code" stressed equal relations
between workers and the need for all Soviet subjects to work according to their own
abilities. The ambiguous nature of these tenets, however, only served to raise more
questions, primarily the meaning of equality. Individuals were concerned about the
continuing sexism in the workplace, especially the use of the derogatory term, "baba"
toward women. It was also unclear if work was defined simply as any labor completed at
a workplace or if it also included forms oflabor for the good of society. Women's work
in the home was time-consuming, adding hours of labor after a full day of work. The
Party had looked to public services to solve women's double burden, but comments on
the code noted the fai lure of these services to free women from their domestic service.
Some suggestions stressed the need to continue promoting women's role in the
workforce, focus ing on their right to be active bui lders of Communism, equal to men.
These indi viduals noted the fact that women had played a_key role in the revolutions of
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1917. Capitalist society had forced women to stay in the home, but under socialism the

Party had promised to liberate these women. Pa11y leaders needed to continue their
efforts to promote women's public involvement, not only by allowing them to work, but
also ensuring that women had time to attend the theater, participate in lectures or
discussion groups, and be a well-cultured Soviet subject. Increasing services, such as
cafeterias, laundromats, and daycare centers, would ease women's domestic burden while
also allowing them to work for the betterment of society.
Not everyone agreed that society and the state needed to force women out of the
home. In their opinion, domestic work was not necessarily a burden, but rather work that
benefited the family and, in turn, society. Women could give their families good, homecooked meals, instead of relying on the poorly-supplied cafeterias. They were also
capable of cleaning their own homes and took pride in maintaining a nice home for their
families. Finally, the time women devoted to raising their children, according to these
suggestions, was just as valuable for Soviet society as time spent in a factory. As a result,
they used the opportunity for public participation to propose providing benefits for
mothers with multiple children to compensate them for both the time and expense that
ra·ising a child required. At the least, these individuals wanted the state to lower mothers'
work hours, easing the double burden. Others proposed time-saving measures, such as
frozen foods, to allow women to ful fill both their social and domestic roles, but to do so
in a more efficient manner. For these individuals, the road to improving society was not
through promoting women's place in society or at work, but by securing her connection
to the home.
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It was not just Party leaders dictating their ideas on proper Communist morality.

In the discussions surrounding vospitanie and women's roles, suggestions came frorri the
top and bottom of Soviet society. Well-known public figures, such as Panova, promoted
their own social ideals, but the commentary also included ideas from workers'
collectives, teachers, factory workers, a:nd general discussion groups organized following
the program's debut. Likewise, both Party officials and common Soviet subjects would
strive to enforce the new norms of the "Moral Code." Society would operate along the
principles of the collective. Everyone would be responsible for learning not only the
values of the "Moral Code" for themselves, but also instructing, policing, and reforming
those around them. Social reform, like the commentary on the "Moral Code," would be
pervasive.
The invasive and repressive elements of some of these suggestions challenge
previous interpretations of the Thaw and the Khrushchev era. In a period traditionally
associated with liberal reform and greater freedom of expression, these suggestions
demonstrate the presence of illiberal currents in Soviet society. Not everyone was
excited at the idea of Jess state control and greater freedom. Some individuals felt that
the state and society needed to intervene in people's Jives more in order to ensure that
subjects behaved as morally-proper Communists. The rapid changes of de-Stalinization,
the returning Gulag prisoners, rising divorce rates, and the chronic issue of parasitism
caused some individuals to fear for the future of cultured Soviet society. They believed
society was out of control. The Thaw had gone too far, and they hoped that their
suggestions would reign in these socially-destructive elements.
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The fact that these individuals were able to voice their concerns, promoting in
some instances a retraction of Thaw-era policies, also challenges interpretations of the ·
Soviet Union's authoritarian nature. Due to the ambiguous nature of the tenets of the
"Moral Code," Party leaders called on the public to discuss the morality code and
forward their own suggestions. The Party was not silencing public discussion but overtly
encouraging it. Due to the uneasy tensions surrounding de-Stalinization, though, some
individuals in Soviet society used the Party-endorsed period of public commentary to
challenge the Thaw, calling for a more intrusive, repressive, and controlling version of
society in the process.
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